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Health AI for Good Rather Than Evil? The Need for a New
Regulatory Framework for AI-Based Medical Devices
Sara Gerke*
Abstract:
Artificial intelligence (AI), especially its subset machine learning, has
tremendous potential to improve health care. However, health AI also raises new
regulatory challenges. In this Article, I argue that there is a need for a new
regulatory framework for AI-based medical devices in the U.S. that ensures that
such devices are reasonably safe and effective when placed on the market and will
remain so throughout their life cycle. I advocate for U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) and congressional actions. I focus on how the FDA could—
with additional statutory authority—regulate AI-based medical devices. I show
that the FDA incompletely regulates health AI-based products, which may
jeopardize patient safety and undermine public trust. For example, the medical
device definition is too narrow, and several risky health AI-based products are not
subject to FDA regulation. Moreover, I show that most AI-based medical devices
available on the U.S. market are 510(k)-cleared. However, the 510(k) pathway
raises significant safety and effectiveness concerns. I thus propose a future
regulatory framework for premarket review of medical devices, including AIbased ones. Further, I discuss two problems that are related to specific AI-based
medical devices, namely opaque (“black-box”) algorithms and adaptive algorithms
that can continuously learn, and I make suggestions on how to address them.
Finally, I encourage the FDA to broaden its view and consider AI-based medical
devices as systems, not just devices, and focus more on the environment in which
they are deployed.
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INTRODUCTION
Artificial Intelligence (AI) is rapidly entering health care and may
fundamentally change the way physicians practice medicine in the future. AI,
especially its subset Machine Learning (ML), shows great potential to improve
health care by enabling precision medicine, where patients receive better diagnoses
and treatment recommendations tailored to their individual needs. The United
States (U.S.) Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has already permitted
marketing of over 340 AI/ML-based medical devices.1
According to one recent estimate, the global health AI market size is expected
to increase more than nine-fold, from $6.9 billion in 2021 to $67.4 billion by 2027.2
The COVID-19 pandemic has also hastened the adoption of health AI.3 The
enormous venture capital investment in the U.S. indicates the rising deployment
of AI in the health care market.4 In 2020, the U.S. accounted for the largest health
AI market share in North America as it is home to several giant technology
companies that are investing strongly in the development of health AI-based
products, such as Microsoft, Google, and IBM.5
1 U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning (AI/ML)-Enabled
Medical Devices (Sept. 22, 2021), https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/software-medical-devicesamd/artificial-intelligence-and-machine-learning-aiml-enabled-medical-devices. For non-FDA
resources, see, for example, Stan Benjamens et al., The State of Artificial Intelligence-Based FDAApproved Medical Devices and Algorithms: An Online Database, 3 NPJ DIGIT. MED., no. 118, at 2
(2020) (identifying 64 AI/ML-based medical devices that received FDA marketing authorization);
Urs J. Muehlematter et al., Approval of Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning-Based Medical
Devices in the USA and Europe (2015–20): A Comparative Analysis, 3 LANCET DIGIT. HEALTH e195
(2021) (identifying 222 AI/ML-based medical devices that received FDA marketing authorization);
Eric Wu et al., How Medical AI Devices Are Evaluated: Limitations and Recommendations From an
Analysis of FDA Approvals, 27 NATURE MED. 582 (2021) (aggregating 141 FDA-approved AI
devices); Am. Coll. Radiology, Data Science Institute AI Central, https://models.acrdsi.org
(providing a database for FDA-cleared, AI-based medical devices in medical imaging) (last visited
Mar. 19, 2022); FDA-Approved A.I.-Based Algorithms, MED. FUTURIST, https://medicalfuturist.com
/fda-approved-ai-based-algorithms (last visited Mar. 19, 2022); and Casey Ross, As the FDA Clears
a Flood of AI Tools, Missing Data Raise Troubling Questions on Safety and Fairness, STAT (Feb. 3,
2021), https://www.statnews.com/2021/02/03/fda-clearances-artificial-intelligence-data.
2 Artificial Intelligence in Healthcare Market, MARKETSANDMARKETS (Oct. 2021),
https://www.marketsandmarkets.com/Market-Reports/artificial-intelligence-healthcare-market54679303.html.
3 Id.; see also Sara Gerke et al., Regulatory, Safety, and Privacy Concerns of Home Monitoring
Technologies During COVID-19, 26 NATURE MED. 1176 (2020) (raising concerns about the hasty
adoption of home monitoring technologies); Carmel Shachar et al., AI Surveillance during
Pandemics: Ethical Implementation Imperatives, 50 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 18 (2020) (discussing
ethical implementation imperatives for AI surveillance during a pandemic).
4 Jason Schoettler, Investors Are Piling Into Healthcare AI Start-Ups; There’s Room for More,
VENTURE CAP. J. (Sept. 28, 2021), https://www.venturecapitaljournal.com/investors-are-piling-intohealthcare-ai-start-ups-theres-room-for-more.
5 Artificial Intelligence in Healthcare Market, supra note 2.

436

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4070947

HEALTH AI FOR GOOD RATHER THAN EVIL? THE NEED FOR A NEW REGULATORY
FRAMEWORK FOR AI-BASED MEDICAL DEVICES

Health AI also poses new legal challenges, including ensuring the products’
safety and effectiveness6, obtaining informed consent7, providing an adequate level
of privacy protection8, and comprehending and resolving liability issues9. As
SpaceX and Tesla CEO/founder Elon Musk warned about AI in 2014 at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s AeroAstro Centennial Symposium:
I’m increasingly inclined to think that there should be some
regulatory oversight, maybe at the national and international level,
just to make sure that we don’t do something very foolish. I mean
with artificial intelligence we’re summoning the demon.10
But how does one ensure that AI is good rather than evil? As Elon Musk
correctly pointed out, the world needs proper regulatory oversight, and this starts
at the national level. Such oversight is especially essential in health care to ensure
that AI does not leave behind the most vulnerable populations, such as racial and
ethnic minorities or people with disabilities, and benefits all patients. In particular,
6 See, e.g., Boris Babic et al., Direct-To-Consumer Medical Machine Learning and Artificial
Intelligence Applications, 3 NATURE MACH. INTEL. 283 (2021); W. Nicholson Price II, Artificial
Intelligence in Health Care: Applications and Legal Implications, 14 SCITECH LAW. 10 (2017); W.
Nicholson Price II, Regulating Black-Box Medicine, 116 MICH. L. REV. 421 (2017).
7 See, e.g., Sara Gerke et al., Ethical and Legal Challenges of Artificial Intelligence-Driven
Healthcare, in ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN HEALTHCARE 295, 301 (Adam Bohr & Kaveh
Memarzadeh eds., 1st ed. 2020); I. Glenn Cohen, Informed Consent and Medical Artificial
Intelligence: What to Tell the Patient? 108 GEO. L.J. 1425 (2020).
8 See, e.g., Nathan Cortez, Substantiating Big Data in Health Care, 14 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y INFO.
SOC’Y 61 (2017); Roger Allan Ford & W. Nicholson Price II, Privacy and Accountability in BlackBox Medicine, 23 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 1 (2016); Sara Gerke et al., Ethical and Legal
Aspects of Ambient Intelligence in Hospitals, 323 JAMA 601 (2020); W. Nicholson Price II et al.,
Shadow Health Records Meet New Data Privacy Laws, 363 SCIENCE 448 (2019); W. Nicholson Price
II & I. Glenn Cohen, Privacy in the Age of Medical Big Data, 25 NATURE MED. 37 (2019); Charlotte
A. Tschider, Regulating the Internet of Things: Discrimination, Privacy, and Cybersecurity in the
Artificial Intelligence Age, 96 DENV. L. REV. 87 (2018).
9 See, e.g., W. Nicholson Price II, Medical Malpractice and Black-Box Medicine, in BIG DATA,
HEALTH LAW, AND BIOETHICS 295 (I. Glenn Cohen et al., eds., 1st ed. 2018); A. Michael Froomkin
et al., When AIs Outperform Doctors: Confronting the Challenges of a Tort-Induced Over-Reliance
on Machine Learning, 61 ARIZ. L. REV. 33 (2019); George Maliha et al., Artificial Intelligence and
Liability in Medicine: Balancing Safety and Innovation, 99 MILBANK Q. 629 (2021); W. Nicholson
Price II et al., How Much Can Potential Jurors Tell Us about Liability for Medical AI? 62 J. NUCLEAR
MED. 15 (2021); W. Nicholson Price II et al., Potential Liability for Physicians Using Artificial
Intelligence, 322 JAMA 1765 (2019); Andrew D. Selbst, Negligence and AI’s Human Users, 100
B.U. L. REV. 1315 (2020); Kevin Tobia et al., When Does Physician Use of AI Increase Liability? 62
J. NUCLEAR MED. 17 (2020).
10 Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Elon Musk at the MIT AeroAstro Centennial
Symposium, YOUTUBE, at 01:07:58 (July 2, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4DUbiCQpw
_4&ab_channel=ElonMuskSoundBites.
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regulators like the FDA need to reconsider the current regulatory paradigm to
ensure that AI-based products classified as medical devices (AI-based medical
devices) are reasonably safe and effective when placed on the market and will
remain so throughout their life cycle. In this regard, several regulatory issues need
to be thoroughly examined and have not received enough attention in the legal
literature.11 This Article endeavors to start to remedy that by focusing on
unresolved regulatory issues of AI-based medical devices in the U.S. and
proposing solutions.
In this Article, I advocate for FDA and congressional actions. I focus on how
the FDA could—with additional statutory authority—regulate AI-based medical
devices. The current regulatory framework for AI-based medical devices is not
only complex and opaque at various points, but there are also recent developments
in this area, which makes it even more difficult to keep track of the applicable
framework. I go beyond the current literature12 by unraveling, inter alia, the
complex network of relevant provisions in the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act (FDCA) and (draft) guidance documents related to AI-based medical devices,
and thereby creating transparency in the field. Only by thoroughly cataloguing and
analyzing the applicable framework can one identify loopholes and flaws, make
suggestions, and thus refashion the discourse and move forward. I also discuss new
regulatory proposals in the field and suggest ways to strengthen them. For many
of my suggestions, the FDA will need to request additional statutory authority.
Once the FDA has acquired enough information to design a new premarket and
postmarket regulatory framework for AI-based medical devices that would ensure
that such devices would be reasonably safe and effective throughout their life
cycle, Congress should enact legislation to enable the FDA to fully implement its
new framework. With the additional statutory authority and its new Digital Health
Center of Excellence,13 the FDA would have the necessary resources to tackle the
regulatory challenges raised by AI.
I argue that the FDA incompletely regulates health AI-based products, which
may jeopardize patient safety and undermine public trust. For example, the medical

11 A few regulatory issues have been discussed by, for example, Nathan Cortez, Digital Health
and Regulatory Experimentation at the FDA, 21 YALE J.L. & TECH. 4 (2019); Barbara Evans & Pilar
Ossorio, The Challenge of Regulating Clinical Decision Support Software after 21st Century Cures,
44 AM. J.L. & MED. 388 (2018); Price, Artificial Intelligence in Health Care, supra note 6; Price,
Regulating Black-Box Medicine, supra note 6; and Nicolas P. Terry, Assessing the Thin Regulation
of Consumer-Facing Health Technologies, 48 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 94 (2020).
12 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 11.
13 The new Digital Health Center of Excellence is located in the Center for Devices and
Radiological Health and is primarily focused on helping stakeholders get high-quality digital health
products to patients. For more information, see Press Release, U.S. Food and Drug Admin., FDA
Launches the Digital Health Center of Excellence (Sept. 22, 2020), https://www.fda.gov
/news-events/press-announcements/fda-launches-digital-health-center-excellence.
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device definition is too narrow, leaving out several risky health AI-based products
that consequently are not subject to FDA regulation. Moreover, I show that
although the 510(k)14 premarket notification is the most frequently used type of
premarket submission for AI-based medical devices, that pathway may not be
sufficient to identify safety and effectiveness concerns. Hence, I propose a future
regulatory framework for premarket review of medical devices, including AIbased ones, that would better ensure that devices are reasonably safe and effective
when placed on the market. Further, I discuss two problems that are related to
specific AI-based medical devices, namely opaque (“black-box”) algorithms and
“adaptive” algorithms that can continuously learn, and I suggest ways to address
them. I also encourage the FDA to broaden its view and consider AI-based medical
devices as systems, not just devices, and focus more on the environment in which
they are deployed. This system view is essential to ensure that AI-based medical
devices are reasonably safe and effective and benefit patients.
This Article proceeds in five Parts. Part I briefly explains relevant terms in
computer science. It also provides an overview of the potential benefits of health
AI-based products.
Part II establishes that the current medical device definition, FDCA section
201(h)(1),15 is too narrow. I argue that several risky health AI-based products
currently fall outside of the FDA’s jurisdiction, such as certain clinical decision
support (CDS) software functions. I propose that all CDS should be considered a
priori medical devices under FDCA section 201(h)(1), and thus that Congress
should consider amending the FDCA accordingly by deleting FDCA section
520(o)(1)(E).16 I also suggest that Congress could amend the medical device
definition to clearly include AI-based mortality prediction models and other
models that are intended for use in the prediction or prognosis of disease or other
conditions.
Part III shows that the FDA cleared most AI-based medical devices currently
available on the U.S. market via the 510(k) pathway, raising significant safety and
effectiveness concerns. It also examines the new 510(k) reforms. In particular, I
argue that the new Safety and Performance Based Pathway likely will not apply to
AI-based medical devices in the next few years. Even if it were applicable, the new
pathway is voluntary and thus manufacturers would still have the option to submit
a Traditional, Special, or Abbreviated 510(k) instead. I therefore propose a future
regulatory framework for premarket review of medical devices, including AIbased medical devices. If the new Safety and Performance Based Pathway proves
to be effective, it should replace the other 510(k) pathways and become the only
14 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) § 510(k), 21 U.S.C. § 360(k).
15 FDCA § 201(h)(1), 21 U.S.C. § 321(h)(1).
16 FDCA § 520(o)(1)(E), 21 U.S.C § 360j(o)(1)(E).
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available 510(k) pathway. In addition, my proposal includes modifying the De
Novo pathway to also cover low to moderate risk medical devices that have a
predicate but would not be eligible for the new 510(k) pathway. Finally, I argue
that the FDA’s new Software Pre-Cert Program—envisioned by the agency as a
voluntary pathway for precertified companies that develop Software as a Medical
Device (SaMD)—comes with its own challenges.
Part IV focuses on issues related to specific AI-based medical devices. First,
I discuss the problem of AI/ML-based medical devices that are inherently black
boxes and explainable versus interpretable AI/ML. I argue that the FDA should
demand AI/ML makers use an interpretable AI/ML system if a white-box model
performs better than or as well as a black-box model. I also show that the focus on
explainable AI/ML in health care is deceptive and argue that regulators like the
FDA should instead focus on ensuring safety and effectiveness. This goal can be
achieved, for example, by requiring at least clinical trials for AI/ML-based medical
devices that have a higher risk level. However, for AI/ML-based medical devices
intended to be used to allocate scarce resources, such as organs or ventilators, the
FDA should demand AI/ML makers use interpretable AI/ML systems rather than
black boxes.
Second, I focus on what I call the “update problem.” AI/ML-based medical
devices can only fully realize their potential if they continuously learn and adapt
to novel situations. But how should regulators like the FDA make sure that these
devices remain safe and effective throughout their life cycle and do not
compromise patient safety? I argue that the FDA could implement a monitoring
system, such as Sentinel, that continuously monitors AI/ML-based medical
devices.
Part V discusses two aspects of the system view: (1) considering human-AI
interaction and (2) improving patient outcomes. The FDA could require rigorous
human factors testing for all AI-based medical devices that require premarket
submission to demonstrate that users can read the labeling and use such devices
correctly. The agency could also more frequently require AI makers to set up a
training program with instructions on how to use their device and/or to include a
detailed description of the recommended user training in the device labeling.
Further, AI-based medical devices should not only be safe but should actually
improve patient outcomes. This could be demonstrated by comparative studies that
the FDA could require, where appropriate, either as a premarket or postmarket
requirement, depending on whether the AI-based medical device in question is
urgently needed on the market.
Finally, I conclude that much more thinking and work needs to be done to
realize the potential of health AI and ensure that such products are reasonably safe
and effective.
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I.

THE POTENTIAL OF HEALTH AI-BASED PRODUCTS

The term “artificial intelligence” (AI) was first coined in 1955 when the four
computer scientists John McCarthy, Marvin Minsky, Claude Shannon, and
Nathaniel Rochester applied for funding from the Rockefeller Foundation for a
two-month, ten-man study of AI to be carried out in 1956 at Dartmouth College in
Hanover, New Hampshire, in the U.S.17 Since then, the term “AI” has been widely
used with different meanings. For example, in a 2004 Article, McCarthy defined
AI as follows:
It is the science and engineering of making intelligent machines,
especially intelligent computer programs. It is related to the
similar task of using computers to understand human intelligence,
but AI does not have to confine itself to methods that are
biologically observable.18
The FDA refers to John McCarthy’s definition.19 There is no universal
definition of AI to date, but the term is often used as an umbrella term that
encompasses several subsets. In particular, its subset Machine Learning (ML) has
become one of the most promising fields of computer science in recent years. ML
uses algorithms to detect patterns in data.20 Deep learning is a subset of ML that
identifies data patterns by employing artificial neural networks with several
layers.21 Advances within deep learning are also major reasons for the success of
health AI in recent years.
Many AI/ML algorithms are “black boxes,” meaning that the estimated
function relating inputs to outputs is difficult or impossible for humans to
understand.22 For example, algorithms labeled as “deep learning” are considered
17 JOHN MCCARTHY ET AL., A PROPOSAL FOR A DARTMOUTH SUMMER RESEARCH PROJECT ON
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (Aug. 31, 1955), http://jmc.stanford.edu/articles/dartmouth/dartmouth
.pdf.
18 John McCarthy, What Is Artificial Intelligence? 2 (Nov. 24, 2004) (unpublished manuscript),
https://homes.di.unimi.it/borghese/Teaching/AdvancedIntelligentSystems/Old/IntelligentSystems_2
008_2009/Old/IntelligentSystems_2005_2006/Documents/Symbolic/04_McCarthy_whatisai.pdf.
19 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., PROPOSED REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR MODIFICATIONS TO
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE/MACHINE LEARNING (AI/ML)-BASED SOFTWARE AS A MEDICAL DEVICE
(SAMD): DISCUSSION PAPER AND REQUEST FOR FEEDBACK 4 (2019), https://www.fda.gov/media
/122535/download.
20 Kun-Hsing Yu et al., Artificial Intelligence in Healthcare, 2 NATURE BIOMED. ENG’G 719,
720 (2018).
21 Id.
22 See Boris Babic et al., Beware Explanations from AI in Health Care, 373 SCIENCE 284, 284
(2021); Boris Babic & Sara Gerke, Explaining Medical AI Is Easier Said Than Done, STAT (July
21, 2021), https://www.statnews.com/2021/07/21/explainable-medical-ai-easier-said-than-done.
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black-box AI/ML models.23 The term “black boxes” can also refer to models that
are not too complex to be understood by humans, but that are deliberately kept
opaque by AI companies for intellectual property reasons.24
Most AI/ML algorithms are “adaptive”—they continuously learn and adapt to
new conditions.25 It is also possible to “lock” AI/ML algorithms in such a way that
they do not change with use and provide the same outcome each time the same
input data is applied to them.26
Computer vision is also a vital subset of AI that focuses on developing
autonomous systems that can perform particular tasks that the human visual system
can carry out, and in some cases even surpass the human system’s ability to do
so.27 Computer vision is essential for the growth of augmented reality, a technology
that is often associated with mobile games such as Pokémon Go and blends digital
and physical environments.28 Robotics is a branch of technology that deals with
the development and design of physical robots.29 Sometimes robotics is also
considered a subset of AI, but experts in the robotic world find it more appropriate
to see AI and robotics as separate fields that overlap in cases of artificially
intelligent robots.30
Health AI-based products are already in use in the U.S., and many more
products are expected to be developed and enter the market in the coming years.
In particular, it is anticipated that health AI will be applied not only in clinics but
also outside the traditional clinical setting.31

23 See sources cited supra note 22.
24 See GREGORY DANIEL ET AL., DUKE MARGOLIS CTR. FOR HEALTH POL’Y, CURRENT STATE
AND NEAR-TERM PRIORITIES FOR AI-ENABLED DIAGNOSTIC SUPPORT SOFTWARE IN HEALTH CARE 14
(2019), https://healthpolicy.duke.edu/sites/default/files/2019-11/dukemargolisaienableddxss.pdf;
Price, Regulating Black-Box Medicine, supra note 6, at 430.
25 See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 19, at 3; Boris Babic et al., Algorithms on
Regulatory Lockdown in Medicine, 366 SCI. 1202, 1203 (2019).
26 See sources cited supra note 25.
27 T. S. Huang, Computer Vision: Evolution and Promise (Sept. 13, 1996) (unpublished
manuscript), http://cds.cern.ch/record/400313/files/p21.pdf; Priya Dialani, Five Important Subsets of
Artificial Intelligence, ANALYTICS INSIGHT (May 14, 2020), https://www.analyticsinsight.net/fiveimportant-subsets-of-artificial-intelligence.
28 Jameson Toole, Combining Artificial Intelligence and Augmented Reality in Mobile Apps,
HEARTBEAT
(June 7,
2019),
https://heartbeat.fritz.ai/combining-artificial-intelligence-andaugmented-reality-in-mobile-apps-e0e0ad2cfddc; Fourth Workshop on Computer Vision for AR/VR,
XR @ CORNELL (June 15, 2020), https://xr.cornell.edu/workshop/2020.
29 Dialani, supra note 27; Alex Owen-Hill, What’s the Difference Between Robotics and
Artificial Intelligence? ROBOTIQ BLOG (Mar. 11, 2020), https://blog.robotiq.com/whats-thedifference-between-robotics-and-artificial-intelligence.
30 See sources cited supra note 29.
31 See, e.g., FROST & SULLIVAN, TRANSFORMING HEALTHCARE THROUGH ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS (2016), https://docplayer.net/36848717-Transforming-healthcare-throughartificial-intelligence-systems.html.
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A. Clinical Application
Health AI-based products are already used by U.S. health care providers and
are expected to be implemented more frequently in the clinical setting in the future.
Health AI shows great promise in medical imaging and disease diagnostics. For
example, Digital Diagnostic’s AI-based medical device, IDx-DR, detects greater
than mild levels of diabetic retinopathy in diabetic patients ages twenty-two and
older.32 The system includes a special camera used by primary care physicians to
take images of patient retinas and upload them to a cloud server.33 The system is
considered “autonomous,” meaning that its decision—either to refer the patient to
an eye doctor or to rescreen in twelve months—does not need to be checked by the
primary care physician who uses the system.34 IDx-DR has been used in clinical
care at over twenty sites across the U.S.35 Another example is Imagen’s
OsteoDetect, a computer-aided diagnosis and detection software powered by AI
that helps providers to detect wrist fractures.36
The hope is that health AI-based products will increasingly help health care
providers to detect diseases earlier and make more accurate diagnoses. Alongside
health AI, robotics is expected to experience a boom in the coming years. 37
According to one recent estimate, the global medical robots market accounted for
$5.9 billion in 2020 and is expected to reach $12.7 billion by 2025, and the U.S. is

32 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DE NOVO SUMMARY CLASSIFICATION REQUEST FOR IDX-DR 1,
5 (2018), https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/cdrh_docs/reviews/DEN180001.pdf; FDA News Release:
FDA Permits Marketing of Artificial Intelligence-Based Device to Detect Certain Diabetes-Related
Eye Problems, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Apr. 11, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/pressannouncements/fda-permits-marketing-artificial-intelligence-based-device-detect-certain-diabetesrelated-eye. For more information on IDx-DR, see IDx-DR, DIGITAL DIAGNOSTICS, https://dxs.ai
/products/idx-dr/idx-dr-overview (last visited Mar. 19, 2022).
33 FDA News Release: FDA Permits Marketing of Artificial Intelligence-Based Device to
Detect Certain Diabetes-Related Eye Problems, supra note 32.
34 Id.; IDx-DR, supra note 32.
35 Jack Carfagno, IDx-DR, the First FDA-Approved AI System, is Growing Rapidly, DOCWIRE
NEWS (Nov. 12, 2019), https://www.docwirenews.com/docwire-pick/future-of-medicine-picks/idxdr-the-first-fda-approved-ai-system-is-growing-rapidly.
36 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., EVALUATION OF AUTOMATIC CLASS III DESIGNATION FOR
OSTEODETECT: DECISION SUMMARY 1, 2 (2018), https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/cdrh_docs/reviews
/DEN180005.pdf; FDA News Release: FDA Permits Marketing of Artificial Intelligence Algorithm
for Aiding Providers in Detecting Wrist Fractures, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (May 24, 2018),
https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-permits-marketing-artificialintelligence-algorithm-aiding-providers-detecting-wrist-fractures.
37 PWC, WHAT DOCTOR? WHY AI AND ROBOTICS WILL DEFINE NEW HEALTH 22 (2017),
https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/industries/healthcare/publications/ai-robotics-new-health/ai-roboticsnew-health.pdf.
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a key market player.38 In particular, increased implementation of AI-assisted
surgery appears likely in the future.39 The use of autonomous systems as robot
surgeons is also not far from reality. Considerable research resources are being
invested in the development of smart surgical robots with different degrees of
autonomy to perform technical tasks, such as suturing, localizing wounds, and
removing tumors.40 These innovations promise better results and wider access to
specialized procedures for patients.41
Augmented reality is also anticipated to experience a strong upswing in the
health care market in the next few years.42 For example, the California-based
company, EchoPixel, developed True 3D, an FDA-cleared augmented reality
device software that provides an environment where health care professionals can
view patient-specific holographic-like images of organs and tissues.43 Medical
imaging and diagnostics, alongside robotics and augmented reality, are just the
beginning of many more potential clinical AI applications that may significantly
change the way health care providers practice medicine.
B. Outside the Clinical Setting
In the 21st century, large amounts of health data are gathered from individuals
not only in clinical settings but also in daily life, such as through the internet, health
applications (apps), Fitbits, and other products. For example, a recent study
predicts that the total amount of data created worldwide will grow from 79
zettabytes in 2021 to 181 zettabytes in 2025.44 The use of big data, coupled with
enhanced computing power, suggests that health AI will likely have rising

38 Medical Robots Market, MARKETSANDMARKETS (2021), https://www.marketsandmarkets
.com/PressReleases/medical-robotic-systems.asp.
39 See, e.g., Sebastian Bodenstedt et al., Artificial Intelligence-Assisted Surgery: Potential and
Challenges, 36 VISCERAL MED. 450 (2020); Tom J. M. van Mulken et al., First-In-Human Robotic
Supermicrosurgery Using a Dedicated Microsurgical Robot for Treating Breast Cancer-Related
Lymphedema: A Randomized Pilot Trial, 11 NATURE COMMC’NS 757 (2020); see also Phil Britt, How
AI-Assisted Surgery Is Improving Surgical Outcomes, ROBOTIC BUS. REV. (June 19, 2018),
https://www.roboticsbusinessreview.com/health-medical/ai-assisted-surgery-improves-patientoutcomes (discussing the promise of AI-assisted surgery to improve surgical outcomes).
40 Elizabeth Svoboda, Your Robot Surgeon Will See You Now, 573 NATURE S110, S110 (2019).
41 See id.
42 Augmented Reality (AR) In Healthcare Market - Forecasts from 2020 to 2025, RES. & MKTS.
(2020), https://www.researchandmarkets.com/reports/4801765/augmented-reality-ar-in-healthcaremarket; Toole, supra note 28.
43 See Letter from Robert Ochs, Dir. Div. of Radiological Health, U.S. Food & Drug Admin.
to Mark Job, EchoPixel Inc. (Mar. 3, 2017), https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/cdrh_docs/pdf17
/K170167.pdf; ECHOPIXEL, https://www.echopixeltech.com (last visited Mar. 19, 2022).
44 Arne von See, Volume of Data/Information Created, Captured, Copied, and Consumed
Worldwide From 2010 to 2025 (in Zettabytes), STATISTA (June 7, 2021), https://www.statista.com
/statistics/871513/worldwide-data-created.
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importance in the future. Already today, the range of direct-to-consumer health AIbased apps and chatbots, on topics from diet guidance to psychological advice, is
immense and is expected to increase even more in the next years.45 For example,
the health AI-powered chatbot, Ada, assesses users’ most likely conditions based
on their symptoms and recommends the next steps to seek appropriate care.46
Another example is the pocket AI therapist, Youper, a self-help app designed by a
San Francisco-based company that supports mental health.47
Wearable health care products such as smartwatches, patches, and fitness
trackers are also in high demand, and the global market is expected to almost
double from $16.2 billion in 2021 to $30.1 billion by 2026.48 For example, in
September 2018, the FDA permitted marketing of Apple’s electrocardiogram
(ECG) app, a consumer-facing medical device intended for use with the Apple
Watch by people ages twenty-two and older that can create, store, record, display,
and transfer a single channel ECG.49 The FDA also authorized Apple’s irregular
rhythm notification feature, an app that is also intended for use with the Apple
Watch and for notifying the user of possible atrial fibrillation (AFib).50 Several
companies are also working on the next future-of-health AI-based fitness products
where virtual trainers plan a user’s workout based on their individual preferences
and needs, motivate the user to complete their workout, and recommend healthy
eating.51
The boundaries between hospitals and homes are also becoming increasingly
porous. The American population is aging, and with this demographic shift comes
45 Boris Babic et al., supra note 6, at 283; Gerke et al., supra note 7, at 301; Remy Franklin, 11
Surprising Mobile Health Statistics, MOBIUS MD (Oct. 25, 2021), https://mobius.md/2021/10/25/11mobile-health-statistics.
46 Ada Health, Ada – Check Your Health, APPLE APP STORE PREVIEW (2022), https://apps.apple
.com/app/id1099986434?mt=8; Leontina Postelnicu, ADA Health’s Chief Medical Officer on AI and
Building Trust in Digital Health Tools, MOBIHEALTHNEWS (Nov. 29, 2019), https://www
.mobihealthnews.com/news/emea/ada-health-s-chief-medical-officer-ai-and-building-trust-digitalhealth-tools.
47 YOUPER (2021), https://www.youper.ai (last visited Mar. 19, 2022); Youper, Inc., Youper
Online Therapy, APPLE APP STORE PREVIEW (2022), https://apps.apple.com/us/app/youper-onlinetherapy/id1060691513.
48
Wearable
Healthcare
Devices
Market,
MARKETSANDMARKETS
(2021),
https://www.marketsandmarkets.com/Market-Reports/wearable-medical-device-market81753973.html.
49 Letter from Angela C. Krueger, Dep. Dir., Eng’g & Sci. Rev., Off. Device Evaluation, U.S.
Food & Drug Admin. to Donna-Bea Tillman, Apple Inc. (Sept. 11, 2018), https://www.accessdata
.fda.gov/cdrh_docs/pdf18/DEN180044.pdf.
50 Letter from Angela C. Krueger, Dep. Dir., Eng’g & Sci. Rev., Off. Device Evaluation, U.S.
Food & Drug Admin. to Donna-Bea Tillman, Apple Inc. DEN180042 (Sept. 11, 2018), https://www
.accessdata.fda.gov/cdrh_docs/pdf18/DEN180042.pdf.
51 Corey Lewis, How AI Fitness Technology Will Take Your Health to The Next Level, 1AND1
LIFE (Oct. 17, 2019), https://www.1and1life.com/blog/ai-fitness-technology.

445

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4070947

YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS

20:2 (2021)

the need to develop new digital health products that enable individuals to live an
independent and healthy life at home as long as possible.52 Computer vision-driven
ambient intelligence systems use video capture to gather and interpret physical
activity data.53 These systems will likely be increasingly used not only in hospitals
but also in patients’ homes in the future. Remote patient monitoring is predicted to
experience a boom in the next few years.54 Such products, including those powered
by AI, can help physicians to remotely monitor their patients’ health conditions,
such as diabetes, asthma, and cardiovascular disease, while improving clinical
efficiency and reducing costs.55 For example, the start-up Current Health offers an
AI-powered wireless device worn on a patient’s upper arm that continuously tracks
vital signs, such as pulse, respiratory rate, and temperature.56
Home monitoring technologies have also been increasingly used during the
COVID-19 pandemic to reduce personal contacts and thus exposure to the virus.57
Further, robots can be helpful assistants in the COVID-19 pandemic. For example,
the San Francisco-based company, RobotLAB, developed a self-driving,
humanoid robot, Cruzr, that is designed to be used in schools. Cruzr can measure
the body temperature of up to sixty people in a minute and detect people who do
not wear a face mask and alert the staff.58
II. NARROW MEDICAL DEVICE DEFINITION
A. Device Software Functions
Are health AI-based products classified as medical devices under U.S. law?
This is a crucial question for manufacturers in particular, since medical devices
usually must meet medical device requirements under the FDCA and are regulated
by the FDA.59 The term “medical device” is defined in FDCA section 201(h)(1) as
follows:
an instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance,

52 Gerke et al., supra note 3.
53 Gerke et al., supra note 8.
54 Remote Patient Monitoring (RPM) Market, MARKETSANDMARKETS (2021), https://www
.marketsandmarkets.com/Market-Reports/remote-patient-monitoring-market-77155492.html; The
State of the Remote Patient Monitoring Market in 2019, DEFINITIVE HEALTHCARE (2021), https://blog
.definitivehc.com/remote-patient-monitoring-market-2019.
55 The State of the Remote Patient Monitoring Market in 2019, supra note 54.
56 CURRENT HEALTH, https://www.currenthealth.com/products-page/product-remote-patientmonitoring (last visited Mar. 19, 2022).
57 Gerke et al., supra note 3.
58 Keeping Schools Virus-Safe Is Not an Easy Feat, ROBOTLAB (2020), https://www.robotlab
.com/pandemic-covid19-health-robots.
59 See infra Section II.C. and Section III.A.
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implant, in vitro reagent, or other similar or related article,
including any component, part, or accessory, which is—
(A) recognized in the official National Formulary, or the United
States Pharmacopeia, or any supplement to them,
(B) intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other
conditions, or in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention
of disease, in man or other animals, or
(C) intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of
man or other animals, and
which does not achieve its primary intended purposes through
chemical action within or on the body of man or other animals and
which is not dependent upon being metabolized for the
achievement of its primary intended purposes. The term “device”
does not include software functions excluded pursuant to section
520(o).60
In the context of health AI, it is particularly relevant whether software
functions are classified as medical devices (device software functions). The FDA
distinguishes between two relevant types of software functions related to medical
devices: “Software in a Medical Device” (SiMD) and “Software as a Medical
Device” (SaMD). SiMD is software that is integral to a medical device.61 In
contrast, SaMD is standalone software that is, on its own, a medical device.62 In
2013, the International Medical Device Regulators Forum (IMDRF)—a volunteer
group of medical device regulators from across the world, including the U.S.,
whose goal is to accelerate international medical device regulatory
harmonization—recognized the increasing importance of software in health care
and published a document on SaMD in which it defines the term as “software
intended to be used for one or more medical purposes that perform these purposes
without being part of a hardware medical device.”63 The FDA embraced this
60 FDCA § 201(h)(1), 21 U.S.C. § 321(h)(1).
61 Software as a Medical Device (SaMD), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Dec. 4, 2018),
https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/digital-health/software-medical-device-samd.
62 Id.
63 INT’L MED. DEVICE REGULS. F., SOFTWARE AS A MEDICAL DEVICE (SAMD): KEY DEFINITIONS
6 (2013), http://www.imdrf.org/docs/imdrf/final/technical/imdrf-tech-131209-samd-key-definitions
-140901.pdf. The IMDRF SaMD Working Group also published two other guidance documents
related to SaMD. See INT’L MED. DEVICE REGULS. F., “SOFTWARE AS A MEDICAL DEVICE”: POSSIBLE
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definition and further clarified that it defines medical purposes “as those purposes
that are intended to treat, diagnose, cure, mitigate, or prevent disease or other
conditions.”64 Apple’s irregular rhythm notification Apple Watch feature is an
example of an AI/ML-based SaMD because it is standalone software intended for
a medical purpose.65 Another example of an AI/ML-based SaMD is IDx-DR,
standalone software intended to be used to diagnose a medical condition, namely
detecting greater than mild levels of diabetic retinopathy in diabetic adults.66
B. Non-Device Software Functions
To assess whether the FDA adequately regulates health AI-based products, it
is important to look at the agency’s statutory authority. Only by analyzing the law
in-depth can one identify legal gaps that may jeopardize patient safety and
undermine public trust.
FDCA section 201(h)(1) clarifies that there are certain software functions that
do not fall under the medical device definition (non-device software functions) and
are thus not subject to FDA regulation. FDCA section 520(o)(1)(A)–(E), added by
the 21st Century Cures Act,67 contains five categories of software functions that
usually are not considered to be medical devices, namely software functions
intended
(A)

for administrative support of a health care facility . . .;

(B)

for maintaining or encouraging a healthy lifestyle . . .;

(C)

to serve as electronic patient records . . .;
....

(D)

for transferring, storing, converting formats, or displaying

FRAMEWORK
FOR
RISK
CATEGORIZATION
AND
CORRESPONDING
CONSIDERATIONS
(2014), http://www.imdrf.org/docs/imdrf/final/technical/imdrf-tech-140918-samd-framework-riskcategorization-141013.pdf; INT’L MED. DEVICE REGULS. F., SOFTWARE AS A MEDICAL DEVICE
(SAMD): APPLICATION OF QUALITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (2015), http://www.imdrf.org/docs/imdrf
/final/technical/imdrf-tech-151002-samd-qms.pdf. In addition, the FDA published guidance on
SaMD in which the agency adopts another 2017 guidance by the IMDRF SaMD Working Group on
the clinical evaluation of SaMD. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., SOFTWARE AS A MEDICAL DEVICE
(SAMD): CLINICAL EVALUATION (2017), https://www.fda.gov/media/100714/download. For further
information on the IMDRF, see INT’L MED. DEVICE REGULS. F. (2021), http://www.imdrf.org.
64 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 19, at 2.
65 For more information on Apple’s irregular rhythm notification feature, see supra Section I.B.
66 For more information on IDx-DR, see supra Section I.A.
67 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114–255, § 3060(a), 130 Stat. 1033, 1130-31 (2016)
(codified at 21 U.S.C. § 360j(o)).
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clinical laboratory test or other device data and results . . .; [and]
(E)

[to support certain clinical decisions.]68

The second and fifth categories are particularly relevant for health AI.
1. Software Functions Intended for Maintaining or Encouraging a Healthy
Lifestyle
Under FDCA section 520(o)(1)(B), a software function is generally not
covered by the term “medical device” in FDCA section 201(h)(1) if it is intended
“for maintaining or encouraging a healthy lifestyle and is unrelated to the
diagnosis, cure, mitigation, prevention, or treatment of a disease or
condition . . . .”69
In September 2019, the FDA issued the guidance “Changes to Existing
Medical Software Policies Resulting from Section 3060 of the 21st Century Cures
Act” (Cures Act Guidance) in which the agency provides its current thinking and
non-binding recommendations on FDCA section 520(o)(1)(B).70 In particular, the
FDA clarifies that its updated non-binding guidance “General Wellness: Policy for
Low Risk Devices” (General Wellness Guidance) helps interpret FDCA section
68 Id. For exceptions, see FDCA § 520(o)(3), 21 U.S.C. § 360j(o)(3) (“Notwithstanding
paragraph (1), a software function described in subparagraph (C), (D), or (E) of paragraph (1) shall
not be excluded from the definition of device under section 201(h) if . . . (i) the Secretary makes a
finding that use of such software function would be reasonably likely to have serious adverse health
consequences . . .); and FDCA § 520(o)(4)(B)-(C), 21 U.S.C. § 360j(o)(4)(B)-(C) (“Nothing in this
subsection shall be construed as limiting the authority of the Secretary to . . . (B) regulate software
used in the manufacture and transfusion of blood and blood components to assist in the prevention
of disease in humans; or (C) regulate software as a device under this Act if such software meets the
criteria under section 513(a)(1)(C) [for Class III classification]”). But these exceptions are only for
certain individual software functions. FDCA § 520(o)(2), 21 U.S.C. § 360j(o)(2) regulates products
with multiple functions that contain at least one function that is not a medical device and one that
meets the definition of a medical device. The FDA issued guidance for such products. See U.S. FOOD
& DRUG ADMIN., MULTIPLE FUNCTION DEVICE PRODUCTS: POLICY AND CONSIDERATIONS—
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION STAFF (2020), https://www.fda.gov
/media/112671/download.
69 FDCA § 520(o)(1)(B), 21 U.S.C. § 360j(o)(1)(B). For some of the problems of the FDA’s
regulatory framework for mobile health technologies before the 21st Century Cures Act, see Nathan
G. Cortez et al., FDA Regulation of Mobile Health Technologies, 371 NEW ENG. J. MED. 372 (2014);
and Nathan Cortez, The Mobile Health Revolution?, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1137 (2014), who argues
that without proper oversight, users will be flooded with mobile technologies that are unsafe and
ineffective. A similar discussion is also continued after the 21st Century Cures Act. See, e.g., Babic
et al., supra note 6.
70 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., CHANGES TO EXISTING MEDICAL SOFTWARE POLICIES RESULTING
FROM SECTION 3060 OF THE 21ST CENTURY CURES ACT—GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND
DRUG ADMINISTRATION STAFF (2019), https://www.fda.gov/media/109622/download.
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520(o)(1)(B).71
Under the General Wellness Guidance, wellness products are products that
present a low risk to users’ and other individuals’ safety and are intended for
general wellness use only.72 The FDA defines two different categories of general
wellness intended uses:
(1) an intended use that relates to maintaining or encouraging a
general state of health or a healthy activity, or
(2) an intended use that relates the role of healthy lifestyle with
helping to reduce the risk or impact of certain chronic diseases
or conditions and where it is well understood and accepted
that healthy lifestyle choices may play an important role in
health outcomes for the disease or condition.73
The FDA explains in its Cures Act Guidance that products that are intended
“for maintaining or encouraging a healthy lifestyle” under FDCA section
520(o)(1)(B) means products that fall within the first category of general wellness
intended uses.74 Thus, FDCA section 520(o)(1)(B) is fulfilled in cases where
software functions maintain or encourage “a general state of health or a healthy
activity” (e.g., physical fitness, sleep management, relaxation and stress
management, weight management, self-esteem, mental acuity, or sexual function)
and are “unrelated to the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, prevention, or treatment of a
disease or condition.”75 For example, an AI-based mobile app that plays music to
relax and soothe a user and to manage stress and an AI-based mobile app that
actively monitors and trends exercise activity are covered by FDCA section
520(o)(1)(B) and thus are not considered to be medical devices.76
71 Id. at 4–5; U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GENERAL WELLNESS: POLICY FOR LOW RISK
DEVICES—GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION STAFF (2019),
https://www.fda.gov/media/90652/download.
72 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 71, at 2.
73 Id. at 3.
74 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 70, at 4–5.
75 Id. at 5; see also U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 71, at 3–4 (explaining the first
category of general wellness intended uses).
76 See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 70, at 6–7; U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra
note 71, at 7. The FDA defines the term “mobile app” as “a software application that can be executed
(run) on a mobile platform (i.e., a handheld commercial off-the-shelf computing platform, with or
without wireless connectivity), or a web-based software application that is tailored to a mobile
platform but is executed on a server.” Mobile platforms are “commercial off-the-shelf (COTS)
computing platforms, with or without wireless connectivity, that are handheld in nature. Examples
of these mobile platforms include mobile computers such as smart phones, tablet computers, or other
portable computers;” see U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., POLICY FOR DEVICE SOFTWARE FUNCTIONS AND
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There is a fine line between the first and second categories of general wellness
intended uses since both categories involve claims about or related to “sustaining
or offering general improvement to functions associated with a general state of
health.”77 The difference is that the second category references diseases or
conditions, while the first category does not.78
The second category of general wellness claims consists of two subcategories:
“intended uses to promote, track, and/or encourage choice(s), which, as part of a
healthy lifestyle, may help to reduce the risk of” or “may help living well with
certain chronic diseases or conditions . . . .”79 The claims should be generally
accepted—i.e., the associations are described in official statements made by health
care professional organizations, such as the American Heart Association,
American Medical Association, and American College of Rheumatology, or in
peer-reviewed scientific publications.80
In contrast to products that fall within the first category of general wellness
intended uses, products that fall within the second category do not meet the
requirements under FDCA section 520(o)(1)(B) since they relate to the prevention
or mitigation of a disease or condition and are thus medical devices under FDCA
section 201(h)(1).81 An example is a health AI/ML-based SaMD that facilitates
making healthy lifestyle choices such as eating a balanced diet that may help living
well with the chronic disease type 2 diabetes.82 Consequently, manufacturers need
to think carefully about the intended use(s) of their health AI-based product, as this
determines whether the product is classified as a medical device. The intended use
may be shown, for example, by advertising materials, labeling claims, or
manufacturers’ or their representatives’ written or oral statements.83
2.

Clinical Decision Support Software

Under FDCA section 520(o)(1)(E), certain clinical decision support (CDS)
software functions are excluded from the medical device definition in FDCA
section 201(h)(1). FDCA section 520(o)(1)(E) reads:
The term device, as defined in section 201(h), shall not include a

MOBILE MEDICAL APPLICATIONS: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION
STAFF 4, 18 (2019), https://www.fda.gov/media/80958/download.
77 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN, supra note 71, at 3–4.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 4 (emphasis in original).
80 Id. at 5.
81 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 70, at 5–6.
82 See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 71, at 5.
83 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 76, at 5.
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software function that is intended—
....
(E) unless the function is intended to acquire, process, or
analyze a medical image or a signal from an in vitro diagnostic
device or a pattern or signal from a signal acquisition system, for
the purpose of [criterion (1)]—
(i) displaying, analyzing, or printing medical
information about a patient or other medical information
(such as peer-reviewed clinical studies and clinical
practice guidelines) [criterion (2)];
(ii) supporting or providing recommendations to
a health care professional about prevention, diagnosis, or
treatment of a disease or condition [criterion (3)]; and
(iii) enabling such health care professional to
independently review the basis for such recommendations
that such software presents so that it is not the intent that
such health care professional rely primarily on any of such
recommendations to make a clinical diagnosis or
treatment decision regarding an individual patient
[criterion (4)].84
The FDA issued a draft guidance in September 2019 that intends to describe
the agency’s approach to CDS software functions (CDS draft guidance).85 A
software function is CDS under this guidance if the following criteria are met:
•

Not intended to acquire, process, or analyze [criterion (1)];

•

Intended for the purpose of displaying, analyzing, or printing
medical information [criterion (2)]; and

•

Intended for the purpose of supporting or providing
recommendations [part of criterion (3)].86

84 FDCA § 520(o)(1)(E), 21 U.S.C. 360j(o)(1)(E).
85 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., CLINICAL DECISION SUPPORT SOFTWARE: DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR
INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION STAFF 5 (2019), https://www.fda.gov/media
/109618/download.
86 Id. at 8 (alterations in original); see infra Figure 1.
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CDS can be Device CDS or Non-Device CDS. Device CDS fails to meet part
of criterion (3) (“to a health care professional) and/or all or part of criterion (4)
(“enabling such health care professional to independently review the basis for such
recommendations”) and thus is a medical device.87 Non-Device CDS meets all four
criteria in FDCA section 520(o)(1)(E) and thus is not a medical device.88

Figure 1: Device and Non-Device CDS
Blue shows the criteria—i.e., criterion (1), criterion (2), and part of
criterion (3)—that software functions need to meet to be classified as CDS. Orange
shows the criteria—i.e., part of criterion (3) and criterion (4)—that CDS need to
additionally fulfill to be considered Non-Device CDS. Green shows Device
CDS—i.e., they meet all criteria in the blue box but fail to fulfill part of
criterion (3) and/or all or part of criterion (4) in the orange box.
The FDA describes in its CDS draft guidance, among other things, its current
interpretation regarding criterion (4). In particular, the agency asks manufacturers
of Non-Device CDS to describe—in plain language—their software functions as
follows:
1) The purpose or intended use of the software function;

87 See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 85, at 6–9.
88 Id.; see infra Figure 1.
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2) The intended user (e.g., ultrasound technicians, vascular
surgeons);
3) The inputs used to generate the recommendation (e.g., patient
age and sex); and
4) The basis for rendering a recommendation.89
To describe the basis for a recommendation, irrespective of whether or not the
software is proprietary and of the complexity of the software, the FDA clarifies
that software developers “should describe the underlying data used to develop the
algorithm and should include plain language descriptions of the logic or rationale
used by an algorithm to render a recommendation.”90 The agency also explains that
the sources underlying the basis of the recommendation or the sources supporting
the recommendation should be identified, available to, and understandable by the
intended health care professional user.91 Examples of identified and available
sources include published literature, clinical practice guidelines with the version
or date, or information the CDS developer has provided to the intended health care
professional user.92 Understandable sources include data points, for example, the
meaning of which is well understood by the intended health care professional
user.93 However, criterion (4) is not fulfilled in cases where the meaning of the
information on which the recommendation is based cannot “be expected to be
independently understood by the intended . . . user.”94 For example, if the inputs
used to generate the recommendation were not identified, a health care
professional would be unable “to independently review the basis for such
recommendation that such software presents” and thus would be relying primarily
upon it.95
3.

The Problem of Health AI-Based Products

The FDA’s CDS draft guidance indicates that AI-based CDS are not a priori
Device CDS and can be considered Non-Device CDS as long as they are intended
for “a health care professional” (criterion (3)) and for the purpose of “enabling
such health care professional to independently review the basis for such
recommendation that such software presents so that it is not the intent that such
health care professional rely primarily on any of such recommendations to make a
89 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 85, at 12.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id.
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clinical diagnosis or treatment decision regarding an individual patient”
(criterion (4)). Two issues should be highlighted here. First, the term “health care
professional” is important to distinguish between Device CDS and Non-Device
CDS. The FDA does not define this term in its CDS draft guidance, but at least
clarifies that CDS intended for the purpose of supporting or providing
recommendations to patients or caregivers are Device CDS (and thus that patients
and caregivers are not health care professionals).96 Second, the FDA’s current
thinking suggests that health care professionals will likely be unable “to
independently review the basis for such recommendation” in cases where the AI
systems rely on algorithms that are “black boxes.”97 It will be challenging, or even
impossible, for software developers of black-box AI/ML models, typically those
that are labeled as “deep learning,”98 to describe the basis for rendering a
recommendation, such as the logic and rationale used by the algorithms.
Manufacturers that keep their models opaque due to intellectual property reasons
may also hesitate to describe the underlying data used to develop the algorithms.
Thus, AI/ML algorithms, for which the inputs and logic are not explained, are
Device CDS.99
But is criterion (4) (“independently review the basis”) convincing enough to
draw the line between Device CDS and Non-Device CDS? The FDA uses a riskbased approach to its regulation of Device CDS by applying the IMDRF
framework for risk categorization of SaMD.100

Figure 2: SaMD Risk Categories Developed by the IMDRF101
96 Id. at 11.
97 For a definition of “black boxes,” see supra Part I. For more information on black-box AI/ML
models, see infra Part IV.
98 Id.
99 See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 85, at 21, 23.
100 Id. at 6; see infra Figure 2.
101 INT’L MED. DEVICE REGULS. F., “SOFTWARE AS A MEDICAL DEVICE”: POSSIBLE FRAMEWORK
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Device CDS inform clinical management. The FDA intends to focus its
regulatory oversight on those Device CDS that fall within the two red boxes. The
agency does not currently intend to enforce applicable medical device
requirements for some Device CDS that fall within the orange box.
The IMDRF framework in Figure 2 above explains two factors that are
essential for the risk categorization of SaMD, which are (1) significance of the
information provided by the SaMD to the health care decision and (2) state of the
health care situation or condition. The first factor is divided into three categories—
i.e., treat or diagnose, drive clinical management, and inform clinical management.
The second factor is also divided into three categories—i.e., critical, serious, and
non-serious.102 There are four risk levels: level I (lowest risk) to level IV (highest
risk).
The right column in Figure 2 is relevant for Device CDS. The IMDRF
interprets the category inform clinical management as follows:
Informing clinical management infers that the information
provided by the SaMD will not trigger an immediate or near term
action:
•

To inform of options for treating, diagnosing, preventing,
or mitigating a disease or condition.

•

To provide clinical information by aggregating relevant
information (e.g., disease, condition, drugs, medical
devices, population, etc.).103

Thus, Device CDS exclusively fall within this category and “inform clinical
management” since they are intended for the purpose of “supporting or providing
recommendations . . . about prevention, diagnosis, or treatment of a disease or
condition . . . .”104 Device CDS intended to provide information, such as diagnostic
or treatment options or aggregating relevant clinical information, may support

RISK CATEGORIZATION AND CORRESPONDING CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 63, at 14 (Figure 2
has been slightly modified from its original form).
102 For more information on the IMDRF’s interpretation of these terms, see INT’L MED. DEVICE
REGULS. F., “SOFTWARE AS A MEDICAL DEVICE”: POSSIBLE FRAMEWORK FOR RISK CATEGORIZATION
AND CORRESPONDING CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 63, at 10–12.
103 Id. at 11.
104 FDCA § 520(o)(1)(E)(ii), 21 U.S.C. § 360j(o)(1)(E)(ii). Device CDS do not “drive clinical
management” or “treat or diagnose,” see supra Figure 2 columns two and three, since both categories
refer to SaMD that go beyond “supporting or providing recommendations,” see U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., supra note 85, at 14.
FOR

456

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4070947

HEALTH AI FOR GOOD RATHER THAN EVIL? THE NEED FOR A NEW REGULATORY
FRAMEWORK FOR AI-BASED MEDICAL DEVICES

recommendations to health care professionals, caregivers, or patients.105 They
provide information that will not trigger a near term or immediate action—unlike
SaMD that diagnose, screen, or detect a disease or condition.106
The FDA intends to focus its regulatory oversight on those Device CDS that
inform clinical management for “critical” or “serious” health care situations or
conditions, shown in the red boxes in Figure 2 above.107 The agency does not
currently intend to enforce applicable medical device requirements of the FDCA
for some Device CDS that inform clinical management for “non-serious” health
care situations or conditions, represented by the orange box in Figure 2.108
The IMDRF framework for risk categorization109 is developed for SaMD but
could also easily be applied to products that are not considered to be medical
devices. Thus, criterion (4) of FDCA section 520(o)(1)(E) (“independently review
the basis”) would only be convincing to draw the line between Device CDS and
Non-Device CDS if it ensured that at least all risk level I and level II products that
inform clinical management for “critical” or “serious” health care situations or
conditions (compare the red boxes in Figure 2) were classified as medical devices
under the FDCA and were thus subject to FDA regulation. However,
unfortunately, this is not the case. It is easy to imagine AI-based CDS that, under
current law, are considered Non-Device CDS but inform clinical management for
“critical” or “serious” health care situations or conditions and thus could pose a
risk to the safety of patients if they were not to function as intended.
As an example, consider Watson for Oncology developed by IBM.110 Watson
for Oncology is CDS that assesses information from a patient’s medical record and
uses AI algorithms to provide physicians with individualized cancer treatment
recommendations.111 Watson did not undergo FDA review since it is considered
Non-Device CDS that is intended for health care professionals who are able to
“independently review the basis” for its recommendations.112 However, the
105 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 85, at 7, 13–14.
106 Id. at 14.
107 Id. at 17.
108 See infra Section II.C.
109 See supra Figure 2.
110 IBM has recently sold main parts of its Watson Health business to Francisco Partners. See
Casey Ross, The Sale of Watson Health Assets Ends a Dark Chapter for IBM. For Its Buyer, the
Opportunity Looks Brighter, STAT (Jan. 21, 2022), https://www.statnews.com/2022/01/21/ibmwatson-health-francisco-partners.
111 See Gerke et al., supra note 7, at 301; IBM Watson for Oncology, IBM (2021), https://www
.ibm.com/products/clinical-decision-support-oncology.
112 Jacqueline Mulryne et al., What’s the Deal With Watson? Artificial Intelligence Systems
and Medical Software Regulation in the U.S. and EU, MONDAQ (Feb. 27, 2017), https://www.mondaq
.com/unitedstates/healthcare/571712/what39s-the-deal-with-watson-artificial-intelligence-systems-
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supercomputer came under criticism in 2018 because of a STAT report that alleged
it recommended “unsafe and incorrect” cancer treatments.113 To IBM’s credit, the
erroneous recommendations were apparently corrected by the company before the
release of the product and its use on real patients.114 Nevertheless, in light of patient
safety, one would like to see Watson and similar products classified as medical
devices (i.e., Device CDS) under the FDCA and subject to FDA regulation so that
manufacturers must provide reasonable assurance of their safety and effectiveness.
STAT also reported previously that the 21st Century Cures Act was hoped to be
the impetus for the FDA to fully regulate medical advisory tools like Watson.115
But IBM reportedly had an extensive team of lobbyists pushing hard for proposals
to vitiate regulatory obstacles facing health software.116 Perhaps as a result of this
lobbying, the 21st Century Cures Act introduced FDCA section 520(o) that
excludes certain categories of software functions, including several CDS, from the
medical device definition.117
If one applied the SaMD risk categories established in the IMDRF
framework118 to Watson for Oncology, the AI-based product would probably be
classified as a risk level II product: Watson informs clinical management by
providing cancer treatment recommendations to physicians, and the state of a
cancer patient’s health care situation or condition would be critical since accurate
and timely diagnosis and treatment action would be vital to avoid death.119 Thus,
Watson and similar products are exactly the kinds of products that the FDA usually
intends to focus its regulatory oversight on. However, such products currently slip
and-medical-software-regulation-in-the-us-and-eu; David D. Luxton, Should Watson Be Consulted
for a Second Opinion?, 21 AMA J. ETHICS E131 (2019).
113 Casey Ross & Ike Swetlitz, IBM’s Watson Supercomputer Recommended “Unsafe and
Incorrect” Cancer Treatments, Internal Documents Show, STAT (July 25, 2018), https://www
.statnews.com/2018/07/25/ibm-watson-recommended-unsafe-incorrect-treatments.
114 See Jo Cavallo, Confronting the Criticisms Facing Watson for Oncology, ASCO POST (Sept.
10, 2019), https://www.ascopost.com/issues/september-10-2019/confronting-the-criticisms-facingwatson-for-oncology; Ross & Swetlitz, supra note 113.
115 Casey Ross & Ike Swetlitz, IBM to Congress: Watson Will Transform Health Care, So Keep
Your Hands off Our Supercomputer, STAT (Oct. 4, 2017), https://www.statnews.com/2017/10/04
/ibm-watson-regulation-fda-congress; see also Gerke et al., supra note 7, at 307 (discussing the
Watson scandal).
116 See sources cited supra note 115.
117 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114–255, § 3060(a), 130 Stat. 1033 (2016) (codified at
21 U.S.C. § 360j); see Gerke et al., supra note 7, at 307; Ross & Swetlitz, supra note 115 (“The
company’s fingerprints are all over legislation passed last year that exempted several types of health
software from FDA jurisdiction. A former IBM executive helped draft the blueprint for the law.”).
118 See supra Figure 2.
119 Critical situations or conditions are “situations or conditions where accurate and/or timely
diagnosis or treatment action is vital to avoid death, long-term disability or other serious deterioration
of health of an individual patient or to mitigating impact to public health.” See INT’L MED. DEVICE
REGULS. F., “SOFTWARE AS A MEDICAL DEVICE”: POSSIBLE FRAMEWORK FOR RISK CATEGORIZATION
AND CORRESPONDING CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 63, at 11.
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off of the agency’s radar due to the fact that they fulfill all four criteria of FDCA
section 520(o)(1)(E) and are thus classified as Non-Device CDS.120 Consequently,
under this analysis, criterion (4) seems insufficient to draw the line between Device
CDS and Non-Device CDS.
Another problem is AI-based prediction/prognosis models that are intended to
aid health care professionals in their decision-making. Are such models CDS?
Imagine, for instance, an AI-based model that leverages data from electronic health
records—without analyzing medical images—for predicting the development of
hospital-acquired pressure injuries among surgical critical care patients.121 Based
on its prediction, the AI-based model provides recommendations to clinicians as
to which patient should be assigned a specialty bed—which cannot be given to all
patients for cost reasons122—and which patient should receive in-depth skin
assessments.
In this example, it seems relatively straightforward to determine the answer to
the question of whether the software is CDS. Criterion (1) of FDCA section
520(o)(1)(E) is fulfilled since the AI-based prediction tool is not “intended to . . .
analyze a medical image” for predicting the development of pressure injuries.123
Criterion (2) is also fulfilled since the tool is intended for the purpose of “analyzing
. . . medical information about a patient . . . .”124 The AI-based prediction model is
also intended to provide recommendations to clinicians as to which patient should
be assigned a specialty bed to prevent the development of hospital-acquired
pressure injuries and which patient should receive in-depth skin assessments to
detect such injuries early and treat them at a reversible stage.125 Hence, criterion (3)
is also met since the tool is intended for the purpose of “supporting or providing
recommendations to a health care professional about prevention, diagnosis, or
treatment” of a hospital-acquired pressure injury.126 Consequently, this AI-based
prediction tool is considered CDS. Under current law, it would be classified as
Device CDS only if the health care professional could not “independently review
the basis for” its recommendations.127
Now consider an AI-based model that leverages data from electronic health

120 The FDCA has a few regulatory safeguards in place. See, e.g., FDCA § 520(o)(3), (4)(B)(C), 21 U.S.C. § 360j(o)(3), (4)(B)-(C). However, such exceptions are limited to particular software
functions only.
121 See, e.g., Jenny Alderden et al., Predicting Pressure Injury in Critical Care Patients: A
Machine-Learning Model, 27 AM. J. CRITICAL CARE 461 (2018).
122 See id. at 461.
123 FDCA § 520(o)(1)(E), 21 U.S.C. § 360j(o)(1)(E).
124 FDCA § 520(o)(1)(E)(i), 21 U.S.C. § 360j(o)(1)(E)(i).
125 See Alderden et al., supra note 121, at 461.
126 FDCA § 520(o)(1)(E)(ii), 21 U.S.C. § 360j(o)(1)(E)(ii).
127 FDCA § 520(o)(1)(E)(iii), 21 U.S.C. § 360j(o)(1)(E)(iii); see supra Figure 1.
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records—without analyzing medical images—for predicting six-month mortality
among cancer patients.128 Is this model CDS under FDCA section 520(o)(1)(E)?
Criteria (1) and (2) are fulfilled since the prediction model is not “intended to . . .
analyze a medical image” for predicting mortality, but it is intended for the purpose
of “analyzing . . . medical information about a patient.”129 However, is this
software also intended for the purpose of “supporting or providing
recommendations . . . about prevention, diagnosis, or treatment of a disease or
condition . . . [?]”130
This question is much more difficult to answer. The algorithm predicts
whether a cancer patient is at high or low risk of dying within the next six months.
The patient has already developed cancer, and thus the software is not intended for
the purpose of supporting or providing recommendations about prevention of
cancer.
The AI-based model is also not intended for the purpose of supporting or
providing recommendations about diagnosis of a disease or condition since cancer
has already been diagnosed in the patient. Instead, the model predicts that the
patient could die within the next six months. Death may be the consequence of a
disease or condition or several diseases or conditions but is not a disease or
condition itself.
Further, one may argue that the output of the AI-based model may initiate a
conversation between the physician and the patient about cancer treatment, and
thus the software is at least indirectly intended for the purpose of supporting or
providing recommendations about treatment of a disease. However, one may argue
as well—probably much more convincingly—that the AI-based model’s
prediction is intended to initiate early end-of-life discussions between physicians
and cancer patients at high risk of dying within the next six months. If one accepts
the latter argument, then the software would not be intended for the purpose of
supporting or providing recommendations about treatment of a disease or
condition but rather the opposite—i.e., to stop treatment, cut costs, and start
palliative care. Consequently, it is unclear whether part of criterion (3) is fulfilled,
and thus whether the AI-based mortality prediction model is CDS.
If one assumes that such a model is intended for the purpose of “supporting or
providing recommendations to a health care professional about prevention,
diagnosis, or treatment of a disease or condition” and thus that it is CDS, then the
classification of a Device or Non-Device CDS depends on whether the model is
intended to enable a “health care professional to independently review the basis

128 See, e.g., Ravi B. Parikh et al., Machine Learning Approaches to Predict 6-Month Mortality
Among Patients With Cancer, 2 JAMA NETWORK OPEN e1915997 (2019).
129 FDCA § 520(o)(1)(E)(i), 21 U.S.C. § 360j(o)(1)(E)(i).
130 FDCA § 520(o)(1)(E)(ii), 21 U.S.C. § 360j(o)(1)(E)(ii).
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for” its recommendations.131
However, if one assumes that the model is not intended for the purpose of
“supporting or providing recommendations to a health care professional about
prevention, diagnosis, or treatment of a disease or condition,”132 then the model
may already not be considered a medical device under FDCA section 201(h)(1).
The software is not “intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other
conditions, or in the . . . treatment, or prevention of disease . . . .”133 The software
is then also not intended for use in the “cure” of cancer, but rather for identifying
patients at high risk of dying within the next six months and thus for enabling an
early end-of-life discussion between the physician and that patient. One may argue
that the model is at least indirectly intended for use in the “mitigation” of disease
since it may contribute to the start of palliative care and thus may support a
patient’s dying without pain. A convincing counterargument may be that the model
only indirectly mitigates the symptoms of cancer (i.e., the pain) but not the disease
itself. As a result, it is highly unclear whether mortality prediction models are
medical devices under current law, and thus whether software developers need to
comply with device requirements of the FDCA.
4.

Amending Proposals

I have argued above134 that criterion (4) of FDCA section 520(o)(1)(E)135 is
not convincing to draw the line between Device CDS and Non-Device CDS
because it does not ensure that at least all risk level I and level II products that
inform clinical management for “critical” or “serious” health care situations or
conditions are classified as medical devices under the FDCA and are subject to
FDA regulation. It is easy to imagine AI-based CDS that are considered NonDevice CDS, although they inform clinical management for “critical” or “serious”
health care situations or conditions.136 Such Non-Device CDS could pose a risk to
the safety of patients if they were not to function as intended. I therefore propose
that—irrespective of whether CDS is intended to enable health care professionals
“to independently review the basis for such recommendations that such software
presents”—all CDS should be considered a priori medical devices under FDCA
section 201(h)(1). Congress should consider amending the FDCA accordingly by
deleting FDCA section 520(o)(1)(E).137
131 FDCA § 520(o)(1)(E)(ii)-(iii), 21 U.S.C. § 360j(o)(1)(E)(ii)-(iii).
132 FDCA § 520(o)(1)(E)(ii), 21 U.S.C. § 360j(o)(1)(E)(ii).
133 FDCA § 201(h)(1)(B), 21 U.S.C. § 321(h)(1)(B).
134 See supra Section II.B.3.
135 See supra Figure 1.
136 See supra Figure 2.
137 FDCA § 520(o)(1)(E), 21 U.S.C. § 360j(o)(1)(E).
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This proposal would promote patient safety since it would ensure that all risk
level I and level II products that inform clinical management for “critical” or
“serious” health care situations or conditions would be classified as medical
devices under FDCA section 201(h)(1) and thus would be subject to FDA
regulation. It would also eradicate the current regulatory gray zone of whether a
particular CDS is or is not a medical device. Criterion (4) is too vague to draw the
line between Device CDS and Non-Device CDS. AI companies are trying very
hard not to fall under the medical device definition, arguing that their CDS is
intended for health care professionals who are able to “independently review the
basis” for its recommendations.138 A proper premarket review can also be seen as
a safeguard against “automation bias.” Studies of human-computer interaction
demonstrate that people tend to trust the machine, even if they have a reason to
question it.139 This is especially a danger in medicine as physicians are very
busy.140 So is it the physician who is currently the captain of the ship, or is it the
CDS that is actually steering the ship? Furthermore, the proposal to classify all
CDS as medical devices would simplify the current regulatory landscape and
facilitate more transparency. Finally, the FDA could continue to focus its
regulatory oversight on those Device CDS that inform clinical management for
“critical” or “serious” health care situations or conditions and exercise its
enforcement discretion for some Device CDS that inform clinical management for
“non-serious” health care situations or conditions.141
For example, following this proposal, the AI-based CDS that leverages data
from electronic health records for predicting the development of hospital-acquired
pressure injuries among surgical critical care patients would be classified as a
medical device, irrespective of whether the CDS is intended to enable the health
care professional “to independently review the basis for” its recommendations.142
It would be likely categorized as a risk level I SaMD since it informs clinical
management for a “serious” health care situation or condition.143 If patients’
hospital-acquired pressure injuries are not detected and treated early, they can

138 Evans & Ossorio, supra note 11, at 390, 394 (arguing correctly that statements of intend by
manufacturers or their representatives tend to be dispositive); see also Cortez, supra note 11, at 11
(arguing that the line between Device CDS and Non-Device CDS remains murky, as it has for
decades).
139 Cortez, supra note 11, at 24. A recent FDA report also says, “Medical informatics experts
expressed concern that providers may rely too heavily on CDS software to determine appropriate
treatments.” U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., REPORT ON RISKS AND BENEFITS TO HEALTH OF NONDEVICE SOFTWARE FUNCTIONS (2020), https://www.fda.gov/media/143795/download.
140 Id.
141 See supra Figure 2 (orange box); see also infra Section II.C (discussing the FDA’s
enforcement discretion).
142 For this particular example, see supra Section II.B.3.
143 See supra Figure 2.
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become irreversible and may require costly interventions (e.g., skin biopsies).144
In addition, the uncertainty of whether AI-based mortality prediction models
are medical devices under current law must be addressed immediately since more
and more hospitals are using them.145 Such models are likely risk level II products
since they inform clinical management for “critical” health care situations or
conditions—i.e., the respective disease, such as cancer, or condition is likely lifethreatening and timely and accurate diagnosis and treatment action is vital to avoid
death or other serious deterioration of a patient’s health.146 Thus, AI-based
mortality prediction models may pose a risk to the safety of patients if they were
not to function as intended. For example, a model could lead to the cessation of a
patient’s treatment if it incorrectly predicts the patient’s early death. Consequently,
AI-based mortality prediction models should be clearly classified as medical
devices under FDCA section 201(h)(1) and subject to FDA regulation.
As a result, in addition to deleting FDCA section 520(o)(1)(E) in the form of
an amendment, Congress could amend FDCA section 201(h)(1)(B)147 as follows:
intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions, or
in the prediction or prognosis of disease or other conditions or
mortality, or in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of
disease, in man or other animals, or
This broad definition would ensure that not only AI-based mortality prediction
models but also other models that are intended for use in the prediction or
prognosis of disease or other conditions would be clearly covered by the medical
device definition. This proposal would promote patient safety and would also
enable the FDA to continue focusing its regulatory oversight on those
prediction/prognosis devices that may pose a moderate to high risk to patients and
exercise enforcement discretion over those that are low risk.148 A clear medical
device definition would also help clarify the outer boundaries of the arena within
144 Serious situations or conditions are “situations or conditions where accurate diagnosis or
treatment is of vital importance to avoid unnecessary interventions (e.g., biopsy) or timely
interventions are important to mitigate long term irreversible consequences on an individual patient’s
health condition or public health.” INT’L MED. DEVICE REGULS. F., supra note 63, at 11, 12.
145 See, e.g., Rebecca Robbins, An Experiment in End-Of-Life Care: Tapping AI’s Cold
Calculus to Nudge the Most Human of Conversations, STAT (July 1, 2020), https://www.statnews
.com/2020/07/01/end-of-life-artificial-intelligence.
146 Critical situations or conditions are “situations or conditions where accurate and/or timely
diagnosis or treatment action is vital to avoid death, long-term disability or other serious deterioration
of health of an individual patient or to mitigating impact to public health.” INT’L MED. DEVICE
REGULS. F., supra note 63, at 11.
147 FDCA § 201(h)(1)(B), 21 U.S.C. § 321(h)(1)(B).
148 For further discussion, see infra Section II.C.
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which the FDA operates.149
Finally, Congress could amend FDCA section 520(o)(1)(B)150 accordingly to
reflect the previous change. The new version could read:
for maintaining or encouraging a healthy lifestyle and is unrelated
to the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, prevention, or treatment of a
disease or condition or to the prediction or prognosis of a disease
or condition or mortality;
C. Enforcement Discretion
1.

The FDA’s Current Approach

The FDA currently intends to exercise enforcement discretion over many
health AI-based products. The agency follows a risk-based approach and aims to
focus its regulatory oversight exclusively on those device software functions
whose functionality might pose a risk to the safety of patients if they were not to
function as intended.151 The FDA does not at present intend to enforce compliance
with the regulatory requirements of the FDCA for software functions that are low
risk and are medical devices or may meet the medical device definition.152 For
example, the FDA intends to exercise enforcement discretion over AI-based
wellness products that are medical devices—i.e., low risk products that fall within
the second category of general wellness intended uses.153 Another example is AIbased mobile apps that may meet the medical device definition but pose a low risk
to patients, such as an AI-based mobile app that uses GPS location data to alert
people with asthma of environmental conditions that may cause symptoms.154
The agency also at this time considers two types of Device CDS that inform
clinical management for “non-serious” health care situations or conditions155 as
low risk and thus the FDA does not intend to enforce compliance with the
applicable medical device requirements of the FDCA.156 The first type is Device
CDS that is intended for the purpose of supporting or providing recommendations
to a caregiver or a patient to inform clinical management for a “non-serious”
health care situation or condition, as long as the medical device is intended for the
caregiver or patient to be able “to independently review the basis for such
149 PETER BARTON HUTT ET AL., FOOD AND DRUG LAW 77 (4th ed. 2014).
150 FDCA § 520(o)(1)(B), 21 U.S.C. § 360j(o)(1)(B).
151 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 76, at 2, 10.
152 See id., at 2, 9, 12.
153 See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 71, at 7, 8; supra Section II.B.1.
154 See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 76, at 9, 22.
155 See supra Figure 2 (orange box).
156 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 85, at 16.
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recommendations that such software presents . . . .”157
The second type is Device CDS that is intended for the purpose of supporting
or providing recommendations to a health care professional to inform clinical
management for a “non-serious” health care situation or condition.158 This Device
CDS is not intended to enable the health care professional “to independently
review the basis” of its recommendations, and thus the health care professional
relies primarily upon it.159
In contrast, the FDA currently intends to focus its regulatory oversight on such
Device CDS that is intended for a caregiver or patient to inform clinical
management for a “non-serious” health care situation or condition and is not
intended for the caregiver or patient to be able “to independently review the basis”
of its recommendations.160 Thus, the FDA considers “opaque” (“black-box”)
Device CDS that are intended for the purpose of supporting or providing
recommendations to caregivers or patients to inform clinical management for
“non-serious” health care situations or conditions as riskier than similar Device
CDS that are intended for health care professionals.161 This distinction is
convincing since health care professionals are usually clinically more experienced
than patients and caregivers and thus may better manage the use of “opaque”
Device CDS and will likely rely on additional sources to make a clinical diagnosis
or treatment decision.
2.

Proposal for a Regulatory Policy

If FDCA section 520(o)(1)(E) were deleted and FDCA section 201(h)(1)(B)
and FDCA section 520(o)(1)(B) were amended by Congress as suggested,162 the
medical device definition would comprehensively include all CDS, AI-based
mortality prediction models, and other models that are intended for use in the
prediction or prognosis of disease or other conditions. These amending proposals
would still enable the FDA to exercise its enforcement discretion over lower risk
software functions that are medical devices or may meet the medical device
definition. For example, the agency could exercise its enforcement discretion over
low-risk prediction/prognosis devices and focus its regulatory oversight on those
that pose a moderate to high risk to patients.
Concerning Device CDS, the FDA could decide not to enforce compliance
157 Id. Compare FDCA § 520(o)(1)(E)(ii), 21 U.S.C. § 360j(o)(1)(E)(ii) (criterion 3), with
FDCA § 520(o)(1)(E)(iii), 21 U.S.C. § 360j(o)(1)(E)(iii) (criterion 4).
158 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 85, at 16.
159 Id; see FDCA § 520(o)(1)(E)(iii), 21 U.S.C. § 360j(o)(1)(E)(iii) (criterion 4).
160 Id. at 17.
161 See supra Section II.B.3.
162 See supra Section II.B.4.
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with the applicable medical device requirements of the FDCA for two types of
Device CDS. First, the agency could exercise enforcement discretion over those
Device CDS that are intended for a health care professional to inform clinical
management for non-serious health care situations or conditions—irrespective of
whether such Device CDS are intended to enable the health care professional to
independently review the basis of their recommendations.163
Second, the FDA could also exercise enforcement discretion over those
Device CDS that are intended for a caregiver or patient to inform clinical
management for non-serious health care situations or conditions and are intended
to enable the caregiver or patient to independently review the basis of their
recommendations.164 The risk of harm is relatively low in this scenario because
independent review by the caregiver or patient of the basis of those Device CDS’
recommendations would likely reveal at least obviously flawed ones at relatively
minimal consequences of error.
Thus, in this way, the FDA could focus its regulatory oversight on those
Device CDS that inform clinical management for critical or serious health care
situations or conditions, and those Device CDS that are intended for a caregiver or
patient to inform clinical management for non-serious health care situations or
conditions but that are not intended to enable the caregiver or patient to
independently review the basis of their recommendations.165

Figure 3: Proposal for a Regulatory Policy for Device CDS
163 See infra Figure 3.
164 Id.
165 Id.
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“Oversight Focus” means that the FDA would focus its regulatory oversight
on those Device CDS. “Enforcement Discretion” means that the FDA would not
intend to enforce compliance with the applicable device requirements of the
FDCA.
III. SAFETY AND EFFECTIVENESS CONCERNS OF 510(K) CLEARANCES
A. 510(k) Premarket Notification and Other Premarket Pathways
Manufacturers intending to bring an AI-based medical device on the market
should follow four steps:
(1) discern the classification of the medical device and
understand the applicable controls,
(2) choose and prepare the proper premarket submission,
(3) send the submission to the FDA and interact with the agency
during its review, and
(4) comply with the applicable controls.166
The first step contains a prerequisite that manufacturers find out whether their
health AI-based product is considered to be a medical device under FDCA section
201(h)(1) and, if so, whether the FDA intends to exercise enforcement discretion
over their medical device.167 If the health AI-based product is a medical device
under the FDCA and the FDA intends to focus its regulatory oversight on such a
device, manufacturers then need to figure out how the agency has classified their
medical device.168 Medical devices, including device software functions, are
categorized into three classes based on their risk degree: Class I (lowest risk),
Class II (moderate risk), and Class III (highest risk).169 The correct classification
of the medical device is essential to understand the applicable controls.170 In
general, Class I medical devices are subject to general controls, Class II medical
devices are additionally subject to special controls, and Class III medical devices
166 See How to Study and Market Your Device, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Oct. 14, 2020),
https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/device-advice-comprehensive-regulatory-assistance/howstudy-and-market-your-device.
167 See supra Section II.C.
168 How to Study and Market Your Device, supra note 166.
169 Id.; see also U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 76, at 10 (clarifying that device
software functions can be categorized into the three classes of medical devices).
170 How to Study and Market Your Device, supra note 166.
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are subject to general controls and premarket approval.171 Examples of general
controls include labeling requirements,172 medical device reporting,173
establishment registration and medical device listing,174 and quality system
regulation.175
As a second step, manufacturers need to choose and prepare the correct
premarket submission. The class of the particular medical device determines the
submission type. There are four common types of premarket submissions:
(1) 510(k) premarket notification,
(2) Premarket Approval (PMA),
(3) De Novo classification request, and
(4) Humanitarian Device Exemption (HDE).176
Class I and Class II medical devices, for which a PMA is not required, require
a 510(k) unless they are exempt.177 Sponsors must demonstrate in a 510(k) that
their medical device is “substantially equivalent” to a legally marketed device
(predicate device) that is not subject to PMA.178 The term “substantially
equivalent” or “substantial equivalence” is defined in FDCA section 513(i)(1)(A)
as follows:
the term “substantially equivalent” or “substantial equivalence”
means, with respect to a device being compared to a predicate
device, that the device has the same intended use as the predicate
device and that the Secretary by order has found that the device—
(i) has the same technological characteristics as the
predicate device, or

171 FDCA § 513(a)(1), 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1); 21 C.F.R. pt. 814 (2022).
172 21 C.F.R. pt. 801 (2022).
173 Id. pt. 803.
174 Id. pt. 807.
175 Id. pt. 820.
176 How to Study and Market Your Device, supra note 166.
177 Premarket Notification 510(k), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Mar. 13, 2020), https://www
.fda.gov/medical-devices/premarket-submissions/premarket-notification-510k. There are also a few
Class III preamendment medical devices that may require a 510(k). See Premarket Approval (PMA),
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (May 16, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/premarketsubmissions/premarket-approval-pma.
178 Id.; see also How to Find and Effectively Use Predicate Devices, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN. (Sept. 4, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/premarket-notification-510k/howfind-and-effectively-use-predicate-devices.
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(ii)(I) has different technological characteristics and the
information submitted that the device is substantially
equivalent to the predicate device contains information,
including appropriate clinical or scientific data if deemed
necessary by the Secretary or a person accredited under
section 523, that demonstrates that the device is as safe
and effective as a legally marketed device, and (II) does
not raise different questions of safety and effectiveness
than the predicate device.179
The FDA defines the term “intended use” for purposes of substantial
equivalence as “the general purpose of the device or its function, and encompasses
the indications for use.”180 The term “different technological characteristics”
means “that there is a significant change in the materials, design, energy source, or
other features of the device from those of the predicate device.”181
A medical device cannot be launched on the market until the FDA has issued
a letter that states that the medical device is “substantially equivalent” to the
predicate device and thus has “cleared” the device for commercial distribution.182
The submitter of a 510(k) has several options for selecting a predicate. Examples
for a predicate include a preamendment device—a medical device that was legally
marketed before May 28, 1976—a medical device that has been cleared via the
510(k) pathway, a medical device that was initially launched on the market as a
Class III medical device and was later reclassified to a Class I or II, or a medical
device that received marketing authorization through the De Novo pathway and
that is not exempt from the premarket notification requirements.183
There are three 510(k) Programs: (1) Traditional, (2) Special, and (3)
Abbreviated. The Traditional 510(k) Program can be used under all
circumstances.184 In contrast, the Special and Abbreviated 510(k) Programs were
developed in 1998 to facilitate the 510(k) review process for particular types of
submissions.185 The Special 510(k) Program is an optional pathway and applicable
179 FDCA § 513(i)(1)(A), 21 U.S.C. § 360c(i)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
180 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., THE 510(K) PROGRAM: EVALUATING SUBSTANTIAL
EQUIVALENCE IN PREMARKET NOTIFICATIONS [510(K)]—GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND
DRUG ADMINISTRATION STAFF 16 (2014), https://www.fda.gov/media/82395/download.
181 FDCA § 513(i)(1)(B), 21 U.S.C. § 360c(i)(1)(B).
182 Premarket Notification 510(k), supra note 177.
183 See How to Find and Effectively Use Predicate Devices, supra note 178; Premarket
Notification 510(k), supra note 177.
184 How to Prepare a Traditional 510(k), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Sept. 12, 2019),
https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/premarket-notification-510k/how-prepare-traditional-510k.
185 Id.; Safety and Performance Based Pathway, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Aug. 27, 2021),
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for certain well-defined changes by the manufacturer to an already legally
marketed predicate.186 The Abbreviated 510(k) Program is also optional and
intended for submissions that rely on the use of special controls, guidance
documents, and/or voluntary consensus standards.187
However, the majority of Class I medical devices and some Class II medical
devices are exempt from the 510(k) premarket notification requirement.188 Even if
a medical device is exempt and the second and third steps—i.e., prepare and submit
a 510(k) to the FDA and receive marketing clearance—are not required,
manufacturers still need to comply with other general controls (fourth step), such
as establishment registration and medical device listing.189
Class III medical devices usually require the most stringent type of premarket
https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/premarket-notification-510k/framework-safety-andperformance-based-pathway. The FDA also issued nonbinding guidance for the Special 510(k)
Program and Abbreviated 510(k) Program. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., THE ABBREVIATED
510(K) PROGRAM: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION STAFF (2019),
https://www.fda.gov/media/72646/download; U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., THE SPECIAL 510(K)
PROGRAM: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION STAFF (2019),
https://www.fda.gov/media/116418/download. The FDA also issued nonbinding guidance for the
content of premarket submissions for software devices, including stand-alone software; see U.S.
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FDA STAFF: GUIDANCE FOR THE CONTENT OF
PREMARKET SUBMISSIONS FOR SOFTWARE CONTAINED IN MEDICAL DEVICES (2005),
https://www.fda.gov/media/73065/download. This guidance document will soon be superseded by
new guidance when final; the FDA has recently issued draft guidance on the premarket submissions’
content of device software functions. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., CONTENT OF PREMARKET
SUBMISSIONS FOR DEVICE SOFTWARE FUNCTIONS (2021), https://www.fda.gov/media/155022
/download. The FDA has also issued nonbinding guidance for off-the-shelf software use in medical
devices. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., OFF-THE-SHELF SOFTWARE USE IN MEDICAL DEVICES:
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION STAFF (2019), https://www.fda.gov
/media/71794/download.
186 How To Prepare A Special 510(k), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (May 22, 2020),
https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/premarket-notification-510k/how-prepare-special-510k; U.S.
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN, THE SPECIAL 510(K) PROGRAM: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND
DRUG ADMINISTRATION STAFF (2019), supra note 185, at 4.
187 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., THE ABBREVIATED 510(K) PROGRAM: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY
AND FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION STAFF, supra note 185, at 3; How to Prepare an Abbreviated
510(k), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Jan. 23, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/premarket
-notification-510k/how-prepare-abbreviated-510k.
188 How to Study and Market Your Device, supra note 168; see also Class I and Class II Device
Exemptions, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (July 1, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices
/classify-your-medical-device/class-i-ii-exemptions (providing information on Class I and Class II
device exemptions).
189 21 C.F.R. pt. 807 (2022); Class I and Class II Device Exemptions, supra note 188; Device
Classification Panels, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Aug. 31, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/medicaldevices/classify-your-medical-device/device-classification-panels; see also Medical Device
Exemptions 510(k) and GMP Requirements, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (2021),
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfpcd/315.cfm (listing Class I and Class II
exempt devices).
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submission: a PMA.190 To receive FDA PMA approval, the sponsor needs to
provide valid scientific evidence that reasonably assures that the medical device is
safe and effective for its intended use.191 The FDA considers “valid scientific
evidence,” for example, to be evidence from partially controlled studies, wellcontrolled investigations, studies and objective trials without matched controls, or
well-documented case histories carried out by qualified experts.192
The De Novo classification request is for novel medical devices of low to
moderate risk, for which there is no predicate device.193 The FDA will carry out a
risk-based assessment for classification of such novel medical devices into Class I
or II.194 Novel medical devices that are classified into Class I or II via the De Novo
pathway may also be marketed and used as predicate devices for prospective
510(k) submissions.195 Originally, the manufacturer needed to submit a 510(k) and
receive a “not substantially equivalent” determination from the FDA before being
eligible for the De Novo pathway.196 This was changed in July 2012, and
manufacturers who determine that there is no predicate now also have the option
directly to submit a De Novo classification request.197 Thus, the new De Novo
pathway is more efficient and less time-consuming. The FDA has also recently
issued a final rule, effective since January 3, 2022, to establish regulations for the
De Novo pathway that shall contribute greater clarity and transparency to the
process, including the submission requirements and criteria for granting,

190 FDCA § 513(a)(1)(C), 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C); How to Study and Market Your Device,
supra note 166; see also U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Premarket Approval (PMA), supra note 177
(explaining when a PMA is required).
191 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Premarket Approval (PMA), supra note 177.
192 PMA Clinical Studies, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (May 22, 2020), https://www.fda.gov
/medical-devices/premarket-approval-pma/pma-clinical-studies.
193 FDCA § 513(f)(1)-(2), 21 U.S.C. § 360c(f)(1)-(2); De Novo Classification Request, U.S.
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Jan. 7, 2022), https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/premarket-submissions
/de-novo-classification-request; How to Study and Market Your Device, supra note 166.
194 De Novo Classification Request, supra note 193.
195 Id. For an example (Proteus’s wearable sensor), see Sara Gerke et al., Ethical and Legal
Issues of Ingestible Electronic Sensors, 2 NATURE ELECS. 329, 331 (2019). The FDA also issued
several guidances related to the De Novo classification process. See, e.g., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
ACCEPTANCE REVIEW FOR DE NOVO CLASSIFICATION REQUESTS: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD
AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION STAFF (2019), https://www.fda.gov/media/116945/download; U.S.
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DE NOVO CLASSIFICATION PROCESS (EVALUATION OF AUTOMATIC CLASS III
DESIGNATION): GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION STAFF (2021),
https://www.fda.gov/media/72674/download.
196 Evaluation of Automatic Class III Designation (De Novo) Summaries, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN. (Jan. 25, 2022), https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/cdrh-transparency/evaluation-automaticclass-iii-designation-de-novo-summaries.
197 See FDCA § 513(f)(2), 21 U.S.C. 360c(f)(2); Evaluation of Automatic Class III Designation
(De Novo) Summaries, supra note 196.
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accepting, withdrawing, or declining a De Novo request.198 The hope is that more
manufacturers take advantage of the De Novo pathway for new technologies.199
Finally, HDE is for Class III medical devices that are intended to help patients with
rare diseases or conditions.200
B. Safety and Effectiveness Concerns
The FDA has already permitted marketing of over 340 AI/ML-based medical
devices.201 However, most AI-based medical devices currently available on the
U.S. market were cleared via the 510(k) pathway. According to a new list of
AI/ML-based medical devices marketed in the U.S., created by the FDA in
September 2021, only 16 of 343 devices were authorized via the De Novo pathway,
such as IDx-DR and OsteoDetect.202 Only one device, QVCAD System for
detecting mammography-occult lesions,203 has so far received PMA approval. All
other 326 AI/ML-based medical devices were 510(k)-cleared. For example, in
January 2017, the FDA cleared Arterys Cardio DL as the first device software
function that uses deep learning to analyze cardiovascular images captured by
magnetic resonance scanners.204 The device is intended to help radiologists,
cardiologists, and other health care practitioners in making clinical decisions.205
Another example is Viz.ai’s notification-only, parallel workflow tool, Viz ICH,
which the FDA cleared in March 2021.206 Viz ICH uses an AI algorithm to analyze
computed tomography (CT) images of the brain obtained in the acute setting and
notifies a neurosurgical or neurovascular specialist where a suspected intracranial

198 See Medical Device De Novo Classification Process, 86 Fed. Reg. 54826 (Oct. 5, 2021);
De Novo Classification Request, supra note 193.
199 FDA in Brief: FDA Proposes Improvements to the De Novo Pathway for Novel Medical
Devices to Advance Safe, Effective, and Innovative Treatments for Patients, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN. (Dec. 4, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/fda-brief/fda-brief-fda-proposesimprovements-de-novo-pathway-novel-medical-devices-advance-safe-effective-and.
200 How to Study and Market Your Device, supra note 166.
201 See U.S. Food & Drug Admin., supra note 1.
202 Id. For more information on these two devices, see supra Section I.A.
203 Letter from Robert Ochs, Dir., Div. Radiological Health, U.S. Food & Drug Admin. to
Robert M. Foley, Vice Pres., Regul. Affs., QView Medical, Inc. (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www
.accessdata.fda.gov/cdrh_docs/pdf15/P150043A.pdf.
204 Letter from Robert Ochs, Dir., Div. Radiological Health, U.S. Food & Drug Admin. to
Golnaz Moeini, Dir. Quality & Reg., Arterys Inc. (Jan. 5, 2017), https://www.accessdata.fda.gov
/cdrh_docs/pdf16/K163253.pdf; see also Cardio AI, ARTERYS, https://arterys.com/clinicalapp
/cardioapp (last visited Mar. 19, 2022) (providing more information about Cardio AI).
205 See Letter from Robert Ochs to Golnaz Moeini, supra note 204, at 16.
206 Letter from Thalia T. Mills, Dir., Div. Radiological Health, U.S. Food & Drug Admin. to
Gregory Ramina, Dir. Regul. Affs., Viz.ai, Inc. (Mar. 23, 2021), https://www.accessdata.fda.gov
/cdrh_docs/pdf19/K193658.pdf. For more information on Viz ICH, see also Viz ICH, VIZ.AI (2022),
https://www.viz.ai/viz-ich.
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hemorrhage has been detected.207
The fact that most AI/ML-based medical devices currently available on the
U.S. market were 510(k)-cleared also reflects the general picture that 510(k) is the
most frequently used type of premarket submissions. For example, in 2017, over
3000 medical devices received 510(k) clearances, representing over 80% of all
cleared or approved medical devices.208 Some Class I or III medical devices are
cleared through the 510(k) pathway, but the majority of 510(k)-cleared medical
devices are classified as Class II devices, and thus are of moderate risk.209 For
example, Arterys Cardio DL and Viz.ai’s Viz ICH were both FDA cleared as Class
II medical devices. However, this statistic is concerning since the 510(k) pathway
has already been under criticism for a long time due to safety and effectiveness
concerns.
1.

The Institute of Medicine Report

The Institute of Medicine (IOM) published a report on the FDA 510(k)
clearance process in 2011.210 In its report, the IOM came to the following
conclusion, among other things:
The 510(k) clearance process is not intended to evaluate the safety
and effectiveness of medical devices with some exceptions. The
510(k) process cannot be transformed into a premarket evaluation
of safety and effectiveness as long as the standard for clearance is
substantial equivalence to any previously cleared device.211
The IOM clearly communicates that “clearance” does not mean that the FDA
“determined that the device is actually safe and effective . . . .”212 The agency only
confirms with a 510(k) clearance that the medical device is “substantially

207 Letter from Thalia T. Mills to Gregory Ramina, supra note 206.
208 See FDA Statement: Statement From FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb, M.D. and Jeff
Shuren, M.D., Director of the Center for Devices and Radiological Health, on Transformative New
Steps to Modernize FDA’s 510(k) Program to Advance the Review of the Safety and Effectiveness
of Medical Devices, (Nov. 26, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements
/statement-fda-commissioner-scott-gottlieb-md-and-jeff-shuren-md-director-center-devices-and.
209 Thomas Sullivan, Institute of Medicine Report Medical Devices and the Public’s Health:
The FDA 510(k) Clearance Process at 35 Years, POL’Y & MED. (May 6, 2018), https://www
.policymed.com/2011/07/institute-of-medicine-report-medical-devices-and-the-publics-health-thefda-510k-clearance-process-a.html.
210 INST. MED., MEDICAL DEVICES AND THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH: THE FDA 510(K) CLEARANCE
PROCESS AT 35 YEARS (2011).
211 Id. at 5.
212 Id.
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equivalent” to, and thus as safe and effective as, the predicate.213 However, the
classification of preamendment devices, for example, did not comprise an
assessment of whether an individual device was safe and effective.214 Thus, many
old predicates were never individually assessed for safety and effectiveness.215
Moreover, data show that a considerable number of manufacturers still rely on old
predicates today. Nearly 20% of all current 510(k) clearances are based on
predicates that are older than 10 years.216 For example, Arterys Oncology DL uses
a deep learning algorithm to assist with lung and liver cancer diagnosis.217 This
device was FDA cleared in 2018, although it relied on a medical diagnostic
application for manipulation, viewing, comparison, and 3-D visualization of
medical images as a predicate to demonstrate “substantial equivalence,” which in
turn relied on another predicate, and so on, up to the reliance on preamendment
devices marketed before May 28, 1976.218
It is important for users such as health care professionals and patients to
understand that “clearance” does not mean “approval.” As discussed above,219
PMA approval is based on a successful demonstration of reasonable assurance of
the safety and effectiveness of the medical device. This needs to be provided by
valid scientific evidence—i.e., usually by clinical studies. However, according to
the list published on the FDA’s website, only one AI/ML-based medical device
has received PMA approval so far.220 In contrast, as mentioned, a 510(k) clearance
only confirms that the medical device is “substantially equivalent” to the predicate.
The 510(k) pathway usually does not require clinical evidence. In fact, the FDA
generally requests clinical evidence for fewer than 10% of 510(k) submissions for
moderate risk devices.221 Thus, the agency often does not require AI makers to
systematically document how the AI-based medical device was created, including
the validation of its performance with another dataset than the training dataset.222
213 Id. at 5, 6.
214 Id. at 6.
215 See id. at 6.
216 FDA Statement: Statement From FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb, M.D. and Jeff Shuren,
M.D., supra note 208.
217 See Letter from Robert Ochs, Dir., Div. Radiological Health, U.S. Food & Drug Admin. to
John Axerio-Cilies, Chief Operating Officer, Arterys Inc. (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.accessdata
.fda.gov/cdrh_docs/pdf17/K173542.pdf; Thomas J. Hwang et al., Lifecycle Regulation of Artificial
Intelligence– and Machine Learning–Based Software Devices in Medicine, 322 JAMA 2285 (2019).
218 See Letter from Robert Ochs to John Axerio-Cilies, supra note 217; Letter from Donald J.
St. Pierre, Acting Dir., Div. Radiological Devices, U.S. Food & Drug Admin. to Casey Conry, Sr.
Project Engineer, Siemens Medical Solutions USA, Inc. (Aug. 16, 2010), https://www.accessdata
.fda.gov/cdrh_docs/pdf10/K101749.pdf.
219 See supra Section III.A.
220 See U.S. Food & Drug Admin., supra note 1.
221 Vinay K. Rathi & Joseph S. Ross, Modernizing the FDA’s 510(k) Pathway, 381 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 1891, 1892 (2019).
222 See Ross, supra note 1.
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However, this is a critical step to ensure that such devices are safe and effective
across various patient populations.223
Concerned that the 510(k) clearance process cannot assure safety and
effectiveness, the IOM recommended that the FDA explore a new medical device
regulatory framework for Class II devices:
The Food and Drug Administration should obtain adequate
information to inform the design of a new medical-device
regulatory framework for Class II devices so that the current
510(k) process, in which the standard for clearance is substantial
equivalence to previously cleared devices, can be replaced with an
integrated premarket and postmarket regulatory framework that
effectively provides a reasonable assurance of safety and
effectiveness throughout the device life cycle. Once adequate
information is available to design an appropriate medical-device
regulatory framework, Congress should enact legislation to do
so.224
The IOM also articulated certain attributes to include in the new framework.
The process should be risk-based, clear, straightforward, predictable, fair, selfsustaining, self-improving, and based on sound science.225 The process should also
“facilitate innovation that improves public health by making medical devices
available in a timely manner and ensuring their safety and effectiveness throughout
their life cycle,” and “should apply relevant and appropriate regulatory authorities
and standards throughout the life cycle of devices to ensure safety and
effectiveness.”226
Further, the IOM states in its 2011 report that the De Novo process may
potentially serve as “a better regulatory model for premarket review of Class II
devices.”227 However, the IOM was also of the opinion that the De Novo process
in its then-current form “is time-consuming and difficult for both the FDA and
manufacturers to navigate.”228 Thus, the IOM recommended the FDA explore a
modified De Novo process to assess the safety and effectiveness of Class II
medical devices.229 The IOM also suggested that the FDA “promptly call for PMA
223 See id.
224 INST. MED., supra note 210, at 8.
225 Id. at 9.
226 Id.
227 Id. at 11.
228 Id. Since the IOM’s report in 2011, the De Novo Pathway has been changed and is now less
time-consuming and more efficient. See supra Section III.A.
229 See INST. MED., supra note 210, at 11.
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applications for or reclassify Class III devices that remain eligible for 510(k)
clearance.”230 Concerning software, the IOM recommended the FDA “develop
procedures that ensure the safety and effectiveness of software used in devices,
software used as devices, and software used as a tool in producing devices.”231
2.

The 510(k) Reforms and Critique

To its credit, the FDA has committed to modernizing the 510(k) pathway—
even though the agency did not follow the IOM’s recommendation of developing
a new medical device regulatory framework for Class II devices. In November
2018, the FDA published a statement in which it communicated, among other
things, three major goals to ensure that 510(k)-cleared medical devices meet the
gold standard for safety and effectiveness:
(1) promoting reliance on more modern predicates,
(2) “up-classifying” medical devices, and
(3) finalizing guidance establishing an alternative 510(k)
pathway.232
The first goal of the FDA is to promote reliance on more modern predicates.233
As discussed,234 nearly one-fifth of all current 510(k) clearances are based on
predicates that are more than ten years old. The FDA aims to drive manufacturers
to rely on newer predicates that reflect modern technology and thereby promote
innovation and improved safety.235 For this reason, the agency suggested in its
November 2018 statement to publish a list on its website of all cleared medical
devices that are substantially equivalent to predicates that are older than ten
years.236 This list would intend to promote transparency and make it easier for users
to decide between older and newer device type versions.237 The FDA has not yet
published such a list, perhaps due to the received criticism by some manufacturers
who called the ten-year threshold “an arbitrary exclusion criterion.”238 While this
230 Id. at 13.
231 Id.
232 See FDA Statement: Statement From FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb, M.D. and Jeff
Shuren, M.D., supra note 208.
233 See id.
234 See supra Section III.B.1.
235 See FDA Statement: Statement From FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb, M.D. and Jeff
Shuren, M.D., supra note 208.
236 See id.
237 See id.
238 Ana Mulero, FDA’s Proposal to Limit Device Predicates Fails to Garner Industry Support,
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suggestion promotes newer predicates, it likely does not ensure that all newly
cleared devices are reasonably safe and effective.
The FDA’s second goal is to continue the efforts of “up-classifying” medical
devices. “Up-classifying” means that the agency re-assigns a medical device to
Class III and requires PMA if the device raises considerable safety concerns. 239
The FDA has already up-classified some previously 510(k)-cleared devices to
Class III so that these devices can no longer be put on the market through the
510(k) pathway.240 Examples include metal-on-metal hip implants, automated
external defibrillators, and vaginal mesh for the treatment of pelvic organ
prolapse.241 From 2012 to 2018, the FDA up-classified a total of approximately
1,500 medical devices.242
The FDA is aware that up-classifying medical devices is resource- and timeintensive, and thus established a third goal: finalizing guidance establishing an
alternative 510(k) pathway.243 In its Medical Device Safety Action Plan, the FDA
discussed the plan to “establish a voluntary, more modern 510(k) pathway for
demonstration of safety and effectiveness for certain moderate risk devices.”244
Under this plan, manufacturers of particularly well-understood device types can
use objective safety and performance criteria recognized or established by the FDA
to demonstrate substantial equivalence.245 In particular, this new pathway aims to
provide more direct evidence of the performance and safety of a medical device.246
The agency achieved its goal and finalized its guidance “Safety and
Performance Based Pathway” in September 2019.247 The new pathway is optional
and an expansion of the concept of the Abbreviated 510(k) Program for

REGUL. FOCUS (May 14, 2019), https://www.raps.org/news-and-articles/news-articles/2019/5/fdasproposal-to-limit-device-predicates-fails-to.
239 See FDA Statement: Statement From FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb, M.D. and Jeff
Shuren, M.D., supra note 208.
240 See id.
241 Id. For further information on the safety scandal of metal-on-metal hip implants, see Brent
M. Ardaugh, The 510(k) Ancestry of a Metal-on-Metal Hip Implant, 368 NEW ENG. J. MED. 97 (2013).
242 See FDA Statement: Statement From FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb, M.D. and Jeff
Shuren, M.D., supra note 208.
243 See id.
244 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., MEDICAL DEVICE SAFETY ACTION PLAN: PROTECTING
PATIENTS, PROMOTING PUBLIC HEALTH 12 (2018), https://www.fda.gov/media/112497/download.
245 See id. at 1; FDA Statement: Statement From FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb, M.D. and
Jeff Shuren, M.D., supra note 208.
246 See FDA Statement: Statement From FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb, M.D. and Jeff
Shuren, M.D., supra note 208.
247 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., SAFETY AND PERFORMANCE BASED PATHWAY: GUIDANCE FOR
INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION (2019), https://www.fda.gov/media/112691
/download.
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particularly well-understood device types.248 The aim is to ensure that new devices’
performance characteristics are assessed against a set of transparent, objective, and
well-validated performance and safety metrics.249 The FDA has issued several final
and draft guidance documents that identify performance criteria and testing
methodologies for particular device types, and more will likely follow in the
future.250 Examples of device types for which the FDA has published final
guidance documents are spinal plating systems,251 conventional Foley catheters,252
and cutaneous electrodes for recording purposes.253 Manufacturers have the option
to use the performance criteria suggested in the final guidance documents to
support “substantial equivalence,” rather than directly comparing their medical
device with that of a predicate.254 The new Safety and Performance Based Pathway
is applicable to manufacturers who intend to submit a 510(k) when three
requirements are simultaneously met:
(1) the device has the same indications for use as the predicate,
(2) the technological characteristics do not raise different
questions of safety and effectiveness than the predicate, and
(3) the device meets all the FDA-recognized performance
criteria.255
The new pathway is certainly laudable and seems promising but raises some
issues, especially in the context of health AI. First, it is only available for those
device types for which the FDA has identified performance criteria. Although the
248 See id. at 4; Safety and Performance Based Pathway, supra note 185. For more information
on the Abbreviated 510(k) Program, see supra Section III.A.
249 FDA Statement: Statement From FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb, M.D. and Jeff Shuren,
M.D., Director of the Center for Devices and Radiological Health, on Latest Steps to Strengthen
FDA’s 510(k) Program for Premarket Review of Medical Devices (Jan. 22, 2019), https://www.fda
.gov/news-events/press-announcements/statement-fda-commissioner-scott-gottlieb-md-and-jeffshuren-md-director-center-devices-and-4.
250 Safety and Performance Based Pathway, supra note 185.
251 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., SPINAL PLATING SYSTEMS – PERFORMANCE CRITERIA FOR
SAFETY AND PERFORMANCE BASED PATHWAY: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG
ADMINISTRATION STAFF (2020), https://www.fda.gov/media/130867/download.
252 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., CONVENTIONAL FOLEY CATHETERS – PERFORMANCE CRITERIA
FOR SAFETY AND PERFORMANCE BASED PATHWAY: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG
ADMINISTRATION STAFF (2020), https://www.fda.gov/media/130865/download.
253 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., CUTANEOUS ELECTRODES FOR RECORDING PURPOSES –
PERFORMANCE CRITERIA FOR SAFETY AND PERFORMANCE BASED PATHWAY: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY
AND FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION STAFF (2020), https://www.fda.gov/media/130864
/download.
254 See, e.g., id. at 3.
255 See Safety and Performance Based Pathway, supra note 185; supra Section III.A.
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FDA aims to publish more guidance documents identifying performance criteria
for additional device types, this pathway targets those that are “well-understood.”
AI-based medical devices are newer products that have only entered the U.S.
market in recent years. There remains much to learn about health AI, including the
optimal data to use to train the model. Thus, it is unlikely that the FDA will identify
performance criteria and publish corresponding guidance documents for AI-based
medical device types in the near future. As a result, the new Safety and
Performance Based Pathway will likely not be applicable to AI-based medical
devices in the next years.
Second, even if such guidance documents for certain well-understood AIbased medical device types were published in the future, this new pathway is
voluntary and therefore manufacturers would still have the option to submit a
Traditional, Special, or Abbreviated 510(k) instead. Thus, a direct comparison of
the performance of the medical device to that of a predicate would still be possible
under the Traditional and Special 510(k) without the agency’s determination that
the device is actually safe and effective.
On January 8, 2021, during the last weeks of Donald Trump’s presidency, then
Health and Human Services Secretary Alex Azar signed a surprising notice that
aimed to make permanent certain regulatory flexibilities provided during the
COVID-19 pandemic by exempting particular medical devices from 510(k)
premarket notification requirements.256 This notice, published in the Federal
Register on January 15, 2021, exempted seven Class I medical devices, namely
different types of gloves, from the 510(k) premarket notification requirement with
immediate effect.257 The notice also suggested to exempt 83 Class II medical
devices and one unclassified medical device from the 510(k) premarket
notification requirement and requested public comments within sixty days of
publication in the Federal Register.258 Several of the eighty-three medical devices
proposed to be exempt from FDA review carry out tasks using AI, such as
computer assisted detection software to help identify bone fractures, respiratory
illnesses, lesions suspicious for cancer, and other medical issues.259
The notice justified these exemptions by stating that the 510(k) premarket
256 Making Permanent Regulatory Flexibilities Provided During the COVID-19 Public Health
Emergency by Exempting Certain Medical Devices From Premarket Notification Requirements;
Request for Information, Research, Analysis, and Public Comment on Opportunities for Further
Science and Evidence-Based Reform of Section 510(k) Program, 86 Fed. Reg. 4088 (Jan. 15, 2021).
257 Id. at 4088, 4096.
258 Id. at 4088, 4096–98.
259 See id. at 4096–98; Casey Ross, “Slippery Slope Territory”: Health Officials Propose
Waiving Regulatory Review of Medical AI Tools, STAT (Jan. 16, 2021), https://www.statnews.com
/2021/01/16/slippery-slope-territory-health-officials-propose-waiving-regulatory-review-ofmedical-ai-tools.
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notification “is no longer necessary to assure the safety and effectiveness of those
devices.”260 Apparently such devices listed in the notice were associated with no
or only few adverse events.261 However, adverse events are tricky to detect in many
AI-based medical devices since they interact with physicians. It can take time to
identify health AI problems, such as hidden biases, and the absence or rarity of
reported adverse events does not mean that the devices work as promised.262 As
argued above and below,263 the FDA needs to tighten, rather than relax, its
oversight of health AI to adequately protect patients’ health. In addition, this
proposal appeared to contradict a newly released Action Plan for AI/ML-based
SaMD issued by the FDA’s Digital Health Center of Excellence in January 2021.264
It was unlikely, however, that the Biden Administration would further pursue
this proposal.265 Indeed, on April 16, 2021, the Department of Health and Human
Services and the FDA issued two related notices in the Federal Register. The first
notice refers to the seven Class I medical devices (i.e., the different types of
gloves).266 It clarifies that the previous determination that these devices “no longer
require premarket notification . . . is flawed” and that it is appropriate to reverse
it.267 The second notice withdraws the proposed exemptions for the eighty-three
Class II medical devices and one unclassified medical device from the 510(k)
premarket notification requirement.268 It highlights that the Department of Health
and Human Services did not notify the FDA before issuing the January notice and
that the proposal by the Trump Administration was made “without adequate
260 Making Permanent Regulatory Flexibilities Provided During the COVID-19 Public Health
Emergency by Exempting Certain Medical Devices From Premarket Notification Requirements, 86
Fed. Reg. at 4096.
261 See id. at 4096-4098; see also Ross, supra note 259 (quoting Karandeep Singh, who
criticizes the notice).
262 See, e.g., Ross, supra note 259.
263 See, e.g., infra Section III.B.3.
264 Id.; U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE/MACHINE LEARNING (AI/ML)BASED SOFTWARE AS A MEDICAL DEVICE (SAMD) ACTION PLAN (Jan. 2021), https://www.fda.gov
/media/145022/download. For more information on the new Action Plan, see infra Section IV.B.2.
This also underscores the question about whether the FDA should become an independent federal
agency distinct from the Department of Health and Human Services. See, e.g., Eli Y. Adashi et al.,
When Science and Politics Collide: Enhancing the FDA, 364 SCI. 628, 630 (2019); Holly Fernandez
Lynch, Steven Joffe & Matthew S. McCoy, The Limits of Acceptable Political Influence Over the
FDA, 27 NATURE MED. 188, 189 (2021).
265 See, e.g., Ross, supra note 1; Ross, supra note 259; Ronald A. Klain, Regulatory Freeze
Pending Review, WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 20, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room
/presidential-actions/2021/01/20/regulatory-freeze-pending-review.
266 Medical Devices; Class I Surgeon’s and Patient Examination Gloves, 86 Fed. Reg. 20167
(Apr. 16, 2021).
267 Id. at 20167, 20170.
268 Making Permanent Regulatory Flexibilities Provided During the COVID-19 Public Health
Emergency by Exempting Certain Medical Devices From Premarket Notification Requirements;
Withdrawal of Proposed Exemptions, 86 Fed. Reg. 20174 (Apr. 16, 2021).
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scientific support.”269 Both April notices are to be welcomed and emphasize the
importance of regulation to ensure the safety and effectiveness of medical devices,
including those based on AI.
3. Proposal for a Future Regulatory Framework for Premarket Review of
Medical Devices, Including AI-Based Medical Devices
If the Safety and Performance Based Pathway is found to be effective, the
FDA should replace the Traditional, Special, and Abbreviated 510(k) with the new
Safety and Performance Based Pathway entirely, thus making it the only available
510(k) pathway for eligible medical devices, including AI-based medical
devices.270 Having only one 510(k) pathway—alongside the other premarket
pathways such as De Novo and PMA—would also make the process more
streamlined for manufacturers. In particular, the Abbreviated 510(k) has been used
only rarely in the past,271 and thus keeping it in addition to the new Safety and
Performance Based Pathway would only make the process unnecessarily
complicated.
Indeed, it seems that the FDA may be open to this proposal. In its November
2018 statement, the FDA mentioned that its goal is to make the Safety and
Performance Based Pathway “the primary pathway for devices eligible for 510(k)
review.”272 The FDA also said that the agency would like “this efficient new
pathway to eventually supplant the practice of manufacturers comparing their new
device technologically to a specific, and sometimes old, predicate device.”273
My proposal to make the new Safety and Performance Based Pathway the
only applicable pathway for 510(k)-eligible medical devices, including AI-based
medical devices, would also require that the current De Novo pathway be
modified. For example, it will probably take several more years for the FDA to
identify performance criteria for some (unlikely all) AI-based medical device
types, and even if the FDA identified such criteria, some devices would perhaps
not be able to meet all of the identified performance criteria. The scope of the De
Novo pathway should thus be expanded to also cover those new devices that would
not be appropriate for the new Safety and Performance Based Pathway.
Consequently, the De Novo pathway could be applicable in two circumstances.
First, as is currently the case, for novel medical devices of low to moderate risk,

269 Id. at 20176.
270 See infra Figure 4.
271 Rathi & Ross, supra note 221, at 1893.
272 FDA Statement: Statement From FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb, M.D. and Jeff Shuren,
M.D., supra note 208.
273 Id.
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for which there is no predicate.274 Second, for low and moderate risk medical
devices that have a predicate, but where the new 510(k) Safety and Performance
Based Pathway is not applicable because the FDA has, for example, not identified
performance criteria for the respective device type.275
The FDA would need to design the exact differentiation criteria between the
510(k) Safety and Performance Based Pathway and the De Novo pathway, such as
their precise scope, detailed requirements for submission, etc. As with the current
regulatory framework, the majority of Class I medical devices and some Class II
medical devices can still be exempt from the 510(k) premarket notification
requirement as long as the exemptions are made with adequate scientific support.
Congress should also enact legislation so that the suggested new regulatory
framework for premarket review of medical devices, including AI-based medical
devices, could be implemented.276

274 See supra Section III.A.
275 See infra Figure 4.
276 See infra Figure 4.
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Figure 4: Proposal for a Future Regulatory Framework for Premarket Review
of Medical Devices, Including AI-Based Medical Devices
The left column shows the traditional premarket pathways—i.e., 510(k)
Premarket Notification, PMA, De Novo Classification Request, and HDE. The
new framework would only have one 510(k) Pathway—i.e., the Safety and
Performance Based Pathway. The new modified De Novo pathway would also
apply in cases where a low or moderate risk device would have a predicate, but
where the 510(k) Safety and Performance Based Pathway would not be applicable
due to, for example, lack of FDA-identified performance criteria. The right column
shows the Software Pre-Cert Program that would exist alongside the traditional
premarket pathways.277

277 See infra Section III.C.
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C. The New Software Pre-Cert Program
1.

Overview

The FDA is currently carrying out a nine-company Pilot Program, launched
in 2019, to explore how to best establish the so-called “Software Precertification
(Pre-Cert) Program.”278 Companies that are involved in the testing phase include
Johnson & Johnson, Apple, Roche, Samsung, and Google’s sister-company
Verily.279 This Program aims to help the agency develop a future regulatory model
for software-based medical devices.280 The first version of the Software Pre-Cert
Program is limited to SaMD. However, if the testing shows that the Program could
also be leveraged for SiMD or other software that are accessories to hardware
medical devices, the FDA will likely expand the Program.281
The Software Pre-Cert Program is designed as a voluntary pathway.282 It
would apply to manufacturers of SaMD that would be “precertified”—i.e., they
would have demonstrated a culture of quality and organizational excellence—and
would have agreed to monitor the real-world performance of their devices once
they are launched on the U.S. market.283 The new regulatory model aims to provide
more efficient and streamlined regulatory oversight of SaMD and to promote
innovation of digital health technologies.284
A key component of the Software Pre-Cert Program would be that the FDA
or an FDA-accredited third-party would perform an Excellence Appraisal.285
Companies would need to be granted a precertification status before being eligible
for this pathway. They would need to demonstrate a culture of quality and
organizational excellence.286 At the moment, the FDA envisions the Excellence
Appraisal to be based on five Excellence Principles:
278 Digital Health Software Precertification (Pre-Cert) Program, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.
(May 6, 2021), https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/digital-health/digital-health-softwareprecertification-pre-cert-program.
279 Id.
280 Id.
281 Id.; U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DEVELOPING A SOFTWARE PRECERTIFICATION PROGRAM: A
WORKING MODEL 9, 10 (January 2019), https://www.fda.gov/media/119722/download. For the
definition of SaMD and SiMD, see supra Section II.A.
282 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 281, at 6.
283 Id. at 6, 37; Digital Health Software Precertification (Pre-Cert) Program, supra note 278.
284 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 281, at 7; Digital Health Software Precertification
(Pre-Cert) Program, supra note 278; Precertification (Pre-Cert) Pilot Program: Frequently Asked
Questions, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Sept. 14, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices
/digital-health-software-precertification-pre-cert-program/precertification-pre-cert-pilot-programfrequently-asked-questions.
285 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 281, at 16–24. For more information on non-FDA
certifiers, see Cortez, supra note 11, at 19 (arguing that it is a genuine innovation at the FDA).
286 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 281, at 16–24.
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(1) patient safety,
(2) product quality,
(3) clinical responsibility,
(4) cybersecurity responsibility, and
(5) proactive culture.287
Companies that demonstrate excellence in product development in all five
Excellence Principles would additionally be categorized into one of two
precertification levels.288 Level 1 Pre-Cert would be granted to companies that
have limited or no experience in delivering SaMD.289 Level 2 Pre-Cert would be
awarded to companies that have a proven track record in developing, providing,
and maintaining safe and effective SaMD.290
Once companies are granted precertification status, they would be able to
bring their SaMD with a streamlined premarket review or without any premarket
review to the U.S. market. Whether a streamlined premarket review would be
required would depend on the risk categorization of their SaMD and their
precertification level.291 The FDA is determining the information needed for a
streamlined premarket review.292 The goal is to allow faster market access while
simultaneously ensuring safety and effectiveness.293
To determine the risk level of the product, the FDA envisions leveraging the
IMDRF framework for risk categorization of SaMD.294 SaMD with a risk level I
would not need to undergo any FDA premarket review. High risk SaMD with a
risk level III or IV would need to undergo a premarket review but a streamlined
version. Risk level II SaMD could be brought to market with no premarket review
or a streamlined one depending on the precertification level of the respective
company. If the company were awarded a Level 1 Pre-Cert, then a streamlined
premarket review would be necessary. However, if the company were granted a
Level 2 Pre-Cert, then its product would not need to undergo any FDA premarket
review. Figure 5 gives an overview of which SaMD would need to undergo a
streamlined premarket review or no premarket review at all.
287 Id. at 11; Digital Health Software Precertification (Pre-Cert) Program, supra note 278.
288 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 281, at 23.
289 Id.
290 Id.
291 Id. at 25.
292 Id. at 31–36; Digital Health Software Precertification (Pre-Cert) Program, supra note 278.
293 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 281, at 31.
294 Id. at 25–30. For more information on the IMDRF framework, see supra Section II.B.3.
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Figure 5: SaMD Risk Categorization Developed by the IMDRF295 (modified to
reflect whether an SaMD from a precertified company would need to undergo
FDA premarket review under the Software Pre-Cert Program)
An SaMD that falls within one of the green boxes would not need to undergo
any FDA premarket review. However, a streamlined premarket review would be
required for an SaMD that falls within one of the red boxes. An SaMD that falls
within one of the orange boxes would need to undergo a streamlined FDA
premarket review if the company were Level 1 precertified. In contrast, if the
company were Level 2 precertified, an SaMD that falls within the orange boxes
would not need to undergo FDA premarket review.
The FDA envisions applying a Total Product Lifecycle (TPLC) approach.296
Once the SaMD were marketed within the U.S., the precertified companies would
monitor their real-world performance.297 The FDA’s approach aims to ensure that
SaMD are safe and effective during their entire life cycle—from premarket
development to postmarket performance.298
2.

Analysis

The current Pre-Cert Pilot Program is a sensible approach to assess whether
the new regulatory model for SaMD assures that the devices are reasonably safe
and effective. The Pre-Cert Pilot Program provides the opportunity to fine-tune the
Program and to solve many open questions. For example, what would happen if a
precertified company were acquired by another company? Already during the
295 INT’L MED. DEVICE REGULS. F., supra note 63, at 14.
296 For more information on the TPLC approach, see U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note
281, at 12–14.
297 Digital Health Software Precertification (Pre-Cert) Program, supra note 278. For more
information on real-world performance, see U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 281, at 37–43.
298 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 281, at 13. To the update problem, see infra
Section IV.B.
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testing phase, Fitbit, one of the nine participating companies in the Pilot, was
acquired by Google for $2.1 billion.299 The FDA has indicated that organizational
restructuring or acquisition that impacts the assessed quality system and processes
might trigger the need for an additional Excellence Appraisal.300
It will be interesting to see the Pre-Cert Pilot Program’s final results and
whether this Program that aims to establish trust and leverage transparency301 can
ensure that SaMD will be reasonably safe and effective throughout their life
cycle.302 This organization-based approach is undoubtedly an experiment with a
new focus on assessing companies and products. It may hold valuable lessons for
other countries and should be closely watched.303 One point, however, is certain:
It is a complicated endeavor, and the Pilot is already taking longer than initially
expected.304
Perhaps one of the biggest challenges the agency currently faces is how the
Software Pre-Cert Program would fit into the current traditional premarket
pathways—i.e., 510(k), PMA, De Novo classification request, and HDE. For the
Pilot, the FDA has leveraged the De Novo pathway.305 The current Pilot is running
in parallel with the traditional De Novo pathway. If a precertified company wants
to place an SaMD on the U.S. market that is eligible for the De Novo process, it
can submit a “Pre-Cert De Novo” during the testing period, and the FDA will run
a traditional De Novo pathway in parallel.306 Thus, the FDA can compare the PreCert De Novo with the traditional De Novo and determine safety and effectiveness.
299 Erin Brodwin & Mario Aguilar, Two Ways Fitbit Could Boost Google’s Health Ambitions,
STAT (Jan. 15, 2021), https://www.statnews.com/2021/01/15/google-fitbit-clinical-trials; Rick
Osterloh, Google Completes Fitbit Acquisition, GOOGLE (Jan. 14, 2021), https://blog.google/products
/devices-services/fitbit-acquisition.
300 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 281, at 15.
301 Id. at 7.
302 See Cortez, supra note 11, at 20–22 (expressing skepticism of the Software Pre-Cert
Program); see also Terry, supra note 11, at 96 (worrying about the fact that the Software Pre-Cert
Program will likely remove more consumer-facing devices from direct regulatory scrutiny).
303 Gerke et al., supra note 7, at 310.
304 For an updated timetable, see U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DEVELOPING THE SOFTWARE
PRECERTIFICATION PROGRAM: SUMMARY OF LEARNINGS AND ONGOING ACTIVITIES 2 (Sept. 2020),
https://www.fda.gov/media/142107/download.
305 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., SOFTWARE PRECERTIFICATION PROGRAM: REGULATORY
FRAMEWORK FOR CONDUCTING THE PILOT PROGRAM WITHIN CURRENT AUTHORITIES (Jan. 2019),
https://www.fda.gov/media/119724/download; see also U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., SOFTWARE
PRECERTIFICATION PROGRAM: 2019 TEST PLAN (Jan. 2019), https://www.fda.gov/media/119723
/download (describing the FDA’s 2019 test plan).
306 U.S. FOOD & DRUG. ADMIN., SOFTWARE PRECERTIFICATION PROGRAM: 2019 TEST PLAN,
supra note 305, at 3, 4; U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., SOFTWARE PRECERTIFICATION PROGRAM:
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK, supra note 305, at 3. For more information, see Software Precertification
Program 2019 Mid-Year Update, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (2019), https://www.fda.gov/media
/129047/download.
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To date, the Pilot has been restricted to SaMD of low to moderate risk for which
there is no predicate, and thus are eligible for the De Novo pathway. SaMD with a
predicate are not currently tested, except if they are eligible for 510(k) under a
device classification created by the Pre-Cert De Novo. Only in this case could
precertified companies submit a “Pre-Cert 510(k)” during the Pilot.307
The FDA has already come under criticism for the limited scope of the Pilot.308
However, it seems that the FDA decided to implement the Pre-Cert Pilot Program
under the De Novo pathway because the agency received pushback from Congress
regarding its statutory authority to implement such a Program.309 As a result, the
FDA decided to leverage the De Novo pathway in the belief that the agency can
test the Program within its current power.310 However, even with this limited
testing format, the FDA has been criticized by scholars and others for exceeding
its statutory authority by implementing the Pre-Cert Pilot Program under the De
Novo Pathway.311
Bakul Patel, the Director of the newly launched FDA’s Digital Health Center
of Excellence,312 expects that the FDA will need to ask Congress for statutory
authority to fully implement the Software Pre-Cert Program.313 This statement also
finds support in the law: The FDA draws its authority from the FDCA and its

307 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., SOFTWARE PRECERTIFICATION PROGRAM: REGULATORY
FRAMEWORK FOR CONDUCTING THE PILOT PROGRAM WITHIN CURRENT AUTHORITIES, supra note 305,
at 3, 4; U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., SOFTWARE PRECERTIFICATION PROGRAM: 2019 TEST PLAN, supra
note 305, at 2.
308 See, e.g., David Lim, FDA Targets De Novo Path to Shepherd Medical Software Through
Pre-Cert, MEDTECH DIVE (Jan. 8, 2019), https://www.medtechdive.com/news/fda-targets-de-novopath-to-shepherd-medical-software-through-pre-cert/545519.
309 SCOTT THIEL & JASON BROOKE, REGUL. AFFS. PROS. SOC’Y, WILL THE FDA
PRECERTIFICATION PILOT PROGRAM WORK? (May 2019), https://guidehouse.com/-/media/www/site
/insights/healthcare/2019/raps--fda-precertification-pilot-program--52419.pdf.
310 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., SOFTWARE PRECERTIFICATION PROGRAM: 2019 TEST PLAN,
supra note 305, at 2; U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 281, at 2.
311 See, e.g., Letter from Sen. Elizabeth Warren, Sen. Tina Smith & Sen. Patty Murray to
Norman E. Sharpless, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Food & Drug Admin. & Jeffrey Shuren, Dir., Ctr.
Devices & Radiological Health, U.S. Food & Drug Admin. 7, 8 (Oct. 30, 2019), https://www.warren
.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2019.10.30%20Letter%20with%20Senators%20Murray%20and%20Sm
ith%20to%20FDA%20requesting%20additional%20information%20on%20the%20agency's%20so
ftware%20pre-certification%20pilot%20program..pdf; David Lim, Top Democrats Question FDA
Pre-Cert Program Safety, Statutory Authority, MEDTECH DIVE (Oct. 11, 2018), https://www
.medtechdive.com/news/top-democrats-question-fda-pre-cert-program-safety-statutoryauthority/539389.
312 For more information on the new Digital Health Center of Excellence, see supra note 13
and accompanying text.
313 Greg Slabodkin, FDA Still Trying to Fine-Tune Pre-Cert as Pilot Enters 2020, MEDTECH
DIVE (Mar. 25, 2020), https://www.medtechdive.com/news/fda-pre-cert-software-device-pilotenters-another-year/574822.
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amendments.314 For any work the FDA wants to pursue outside of the FDCA and
its amendments, the agency must obtain Congress’s approval in the form of another
amendment to the FDCA.315 Looking at an earlier draft of the 21st Century Cures
Act also suggests that the FDA must ask Congress for statutory authority to
implement the Program fully. This earlier draft contained a provision that would
have amended the FDCA and authorized the FDA to implement a new regulatory
framework for health software,316 but that provision was not incorporated into the
final version of the Act.317
3.

Implementation Proposal

So how could the Software Pre-Cert Program ideally be implemented in the
future? It makes sense that the Software Pre-Cert Program would be implemented
as a voluntary pathway, as it is currently designed. It is in the nature of things that
not every company can be awarded a precertification status based on excellence.
However, one needs to see in the long-term how many companies—e.g., a handful
or hundreds—would ultimately use this pathway. In particular, the FDA needs to
make sure that the Program would not de facto favor larger companies that have
the necessary resources to undergo an Excellence Appraisal. The Program should
also benefit small- and medium-sized enterprises. In the field of health AI, for
example, there are many new start-ups that should also be given a realistic chance
to get precertified and benefit from such a Program. Thus, it will be crucial for the
FDA to closely watch the potential market effects of implementing the Software
Pre-Cert Program. Such a Program could potentially bias the market toward
established big players who are able to achieve a precertification status and thereby
either quash innovation by new players or possibly over-incentivize intellectual
property sales of health AI to precertified players. Thus, it will be crucial that the
Software Pre-Cert Program distributes precertification status in a manner that
promotes innovation at the same time as safety and effectiveness.
Suppose the FDA establishes the Software Pre-Cert Program’s specific
details, the Pilot proves to be effective, and the FDA has statutory authority. In that
case, the agency theoretically would have two options regarding the Program’s
implementation. First, the agency could implement it similarly to the Pre-Cert Pilot
Program, and even expand its scope so that precertified companies could submit,
for example, a Pre-Cert 510(k) without the need for a device classification created
by the Pre-Cert De Novo. At a later stage, the FDA could further expand the

314 THIEL & BROOKE, supra note 309, at 4.
315 Id.
316 See 21st Century Cures Act, H.R. 6, 114th Cong. § 2242 (2015).
317 See Cortez, supra note 11, at 25.
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Program for SiMD and other software that are accessories to hardware medical
devices. Second, the Software Pre-Cert Program could run completely separate
from the traditional premarket pathways as an independent voluntary pathway with
its own conditions.318
Irrespective of whether the FDA would choose the first or second option, the
traditional premarket pathways would continue to be available for those companies
that do not receive precertification status. Thus, it will be all the more important
that the traditional pathways are robust and ensure that medical devices, including
AI-based medical devices, are reasonably safe and effective when placed on the
market. Consequently, the FDA needs to address the safety and effectiveness
concerns of the traditional premarket pathways as soon as possible and
implement—after receiving additional statutory authority—a new regulatory
framework, such as the one that I have suggested above.319
IV. PROBLEMS RELATED TO SPECIFIC AI-BASED MEDICAL DEVICES
A. Black-Box AI/ML Models and Explainable Versus Interpretable AI/ML
1.

The Problem

Another problem that needs to be addressed in the new suggested
framework320 is AI-based medical devices that are “black boxes.” As explained
above, many high-performing AI/ML systems rely on algorithms that are “black
boxes.”321 Black-box algorithms are difficult or impossible for humans to
understand.322 Algorithms typically labeled as “deep learning” are black-box
AI/ML models.323 The term “black boxes” can also refer to algorithms that are
deliberately black boxes because, for intellectual property reasons, developers do
not want to disclose the details of how these algorithms work.324 I focus here on
the first group of algorithms, namely those that are inherently black boxes.
Noninterpretable black-box models have been shown to perform better than
interpretable models in several practicable scenarios.325 In particular, in health
care, black-box AI/ML models often perform better, such as in image

318 See supra Figure 4.
319 See supra Section III.B.3.
320 See supra Figure 4.
321 See supra Part I.
322 Babic et al., supra note 22, at 284; Babic & Gerke, supra note 22.
323 Id.
324 Price, Regulating Black-Box Medicine, supra note 6, at 430.
325 Hongfang Liu et al., AI Model Development and Validation, in ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
IN HEALTH CARE: THE HOPE, THE HYPE, THE PROMISE, THE PERIL 124 (Michael Matheny et al., eds.,
1st ed. 2019).

490

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4070947

HEALTH AI FOR GOOD RATHER THAN EVIL? THE NEED FOR A NEW REGULATORY
FRAMEWORK FOR AI-BASED MEDICAL DEVICES

recognition.326 However, especially in Europe, there is a movement for explainable
AI/ML since various scholars argue that the EU General Data Protection
Regulation (2016/679)327 contains a “right to explanation” of automated decisionmaking.328 In contrast, the U.S. follows a more market-driven approach, and the
FDA has already permitted marketing of several AI/ML-based medical devices
that use noninterpretable black-box models.329 For example, Imagen’s OsteoDetect
and Arterys Cardio DL both use deep learning.330
So which approach is the right one? Should regulators like the FDA continue
to permit marketing of black-box AI/ML systems or only permit marketing of
explainable and/or interpretable AI/ML?
One thing should be clear here: It is crucial to understand the difference
between interpretable AI/ML and explainable AI/ML. As defined here,
interpretable AI/ML uses a “white-box” model (i.e., a transparent system), such as
a linear or simple decision tree model, instead of a black box.331 The advantage of
interpretable AI/ML algorithms is that they are open and understandable at a
human level with reasonable effort.332 In contrast, the term “explainable AI/ML”
is understood here in connection with a black-box model that is used to make
diagnoses or predictions.333 A second explanatory algorithm—which is itself a
white-box model—is developed that closely approximates the outputs of the black
box.334
The issue with explainable AI/ML, however, is that because the second
algorithm is usually not as accurate as the black box, it is normally used to develop
326 Babic et al., supra note 22.
327 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016
on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free
movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation),
2016 O.J. (L. 119) 1.
328 For more information on this debate, see, for example, Andrew Burt, Is There a ‘Right to
Explanation’ for Machine Learning in the GDPR?, IAPP (June 1, 2017), https://iapp.org/news/a/isthere-a-right-to-explanation-for-machine-learning-in-the-gdpr; Bryce Goodman & Seth Flaxman,
European Union Regulations on Algorithmic Decision Making and a “Right to Explanation”, 38 AI
MAG. 50 (2017); Sandra Wachter et al., Why a Right to Explanation of Automated Decision-Making
Does Not Exist in the General Data Protection Regulation, 7 INT’L DATA PRIV. L. 76 (2017); Margot
E. Kaminski, The Right to Explanation, Explained, 34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 189 (2019); Gerke et al.,
supra note 7, at 322.
329 Babic et al., supra note 22. See also Mark Ratner, FDA Backs Clinician-Free AI Imaging
Diagnostic Tools, 36 NATURE BIOTEC. 673, 674 (2018) (quoting Eric Perakslis, former chief
information officer at the FDA: “You are seeing FDA not just approving these tools, they are
accelerating them”).
330 For more information on such devices, see supra Section I.A and Section III.B.
331 See Babic et al., supra note 22, at 284; Babic & Gerke, supra note 22.
332 See sources cited supra note 331.
333 Id.
334 Id.
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only post hoc explanations for the outputs of the black box and not to make actual
predictions.335 In other words, explainable AI/ML offers post hoc explanations for
black-box predictions without necessarily giving the actual reasons behind such
predictions.336 For example, imagine a black-box model predicting a patient’s high
risk of stroke.337 The second explanatory algorithm might say that the black-box
prediction is consistent with a linear model, which relies on one’s smoking and
blood pressure status.338 However, this post hoc explanation may not be the actual
reason why the black-box model predicted the patient’s high risk of stroke.
Explainable AI/ML only generates an “ersatz understanding.”339 Many other
algorithmically generated explanations are easily conceivable here that are also
consistent with the prediction of the black box.340 For instance, it could also be the
case that the patient’s high risk of stroke is consistent with a decision tree, which
relies on their diabetes and gender status.341 Hence, in the context of explainable
AI/ML, there is a high risk of a false impression that one better understands blackbox predictions and thus a false sense of user (over)confidence in the explanations
provided.342
Consequently, regulators like the FDA need to be cautious about requiring
explainable AI/ML as a prerequisite of marketing authorization since its benefits
in health care are not what they currently appear to be.343 The gold standard should
be that regulators require AI/ML makers to use an interpretable AI/ML system—
if a white-box model performs better than or as well as a black-box AI/ML
model—and focus on ensuring the model’s safety and effectiveness. However, if
there is sufficient proof that a black-box model performs better than a white-box
model and is reasonably safe and effective, and the accuracy increase outweighs
the loss of model interpretability, then regulators should generally permit
marketing of the black-box AI/ML model as such (without requiring explainable
AI/ML) to facilitate innovations. To achieve this goal, regulators could reach, at
least in some cases, into an already existing toolbox: clinical trials.
2.

Clinical Trials

For drugs and vaccines, clinical trials are the standard method to prove that
they are reasonably safe and effective for their intended use. There are several steps
335 Id.
336 Babic et al., supra note 22, at 285; Babic & Gerke, supra note 22.
337 Babic & Gerke, supra note 22.
338 Id.
339 Babic et al., supra note 22, at 285; Babic & Gerke, supra note 22.
340 Babic & Gerke, supra note 22.
341 Id.
342 Babic et al., supra note 22, at 285; Babic & Gerke, supra note 22.
343 Babic et al., supra note 22, at 286; Babic & Gerke, supra note 22.
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involved in the drug and vaccine development process, one of which is clinical
research. The FDA typically requires successful completion of three phases before
granting marketing approval of a drug or vaccine.344 For clinical trials of drugs, for
example, Phase 1 is typically carried out with 20 to 100 healthy volunteers or
people with the disease or condition to test safety and dosage; Phase 2 has up to
several hundred people with the disease or condition and aims to evaluate the
drug’s efficacy and side effects; and Phase 3 is carried out on a large scale with
about 300 to 3,000 volunteers who have the disease or condition and is designed
to further assess the efficacy and to monitor adverse reactions.345 In Randomized
Clinical Trials (RCTs), participants are randomly allocated to separate groups that
compare different treatments/interventions.346 In this way, RCTs help to mitigate
bias and assess efficacy.347
For some medical devices the FDA demands clinical studies.348 These are
typically medical devices that require a PMA.349 Medical device trials are usually
smaller than drug and vaccine trials, but they serve a similar purpose: to support a
reasonable assurance that the medical device is safe and effective for its intended
use.350
However, in the field of health AI, clinical trials are nearly nonexistent. As
discussed above,351 most AI-based medical devices that are currently available on
the U.S. market received 510(k) clearances, for which the FDA usually does not
request any clinical evidence. One example of an exception in the field is Digital
Diagnostic’s IDx-DR, which received marketing authorization via the De Novo
pathway.352 The AI company carried out a pivotal clinical study with 900 patients
to show IDx-DR’s performance.353 However, even IDx-DR did not receive
344 Step 3: Clinical Research, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.fda.gov
/patients/drug-development-process/step-3-clinical-research; Vaccine Development – 101, U.S.
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Dec. 14, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/vaccines-blood-biologics/development
-approval-process-cber/vaccine-development-101.
345 Step 3: Clinical Research, supra note 344.
346 Randomized Clinical Trial, NAT’L INSTS. HEALTH, https://www.cancer.gov/publications
/dictionaries/cancer-terms/def/randomized-clinical-trial.
347 Id.
348 See OWEN FARIS, CLINICAL TRIALS FOR MEDICAL DEVICES: FDA AND THE IDE PROCESS 9,
https://www.fda.gov/media/87603/download; supra Section III.A.
349 How to Study and Market Your Device, supra note 166. For more information on
investigational device exemptions, see Investigational Device Exemption (IDE), U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN. (Dec. 13, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/how-study-and-market-your-device
/investigational-device-exemption-ide.
350 FARIS, supra note 348, at 5.
351 See supra Section III.B.
352 For more information about IDx-DR, see supra Section I.A.
353 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 32; Michael D. Abràmoff et al., Pivotal Trial of an
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marketing authorization based on RCT evidence that the information provided by
the AI-based medical device improved care.354 A recent study has also shown that
between 2011 and 2019 the FDA often permitted marketing of therapeutic medical
devices via the De Novo pathway regardless of limited clinical evidence of
effectiveness.355 Moreover, the first two RCTs of AI/ML have only just been
published in 2019.356 By way of example, in one of these RCTs, 536 patients were
randomly allocated to standard colonoscopy and 522 patients to colonoscopy with
computer-aided diagnosis.357
When exploring a new regulatory framework for AI-based medical devices,
the FDA should prefer the use of interpretable AI/ML systems in cases where
white-box models perform as good as or better than black-box AI/ML models. Of
course, the manufacturer must also provide reasonable assurance of the safety and
effectiveness of a white box, which may also require the conduct of a clinical trial
in a case where the device presents a higher risk level. However, suppose the blackbox AI/ML model performs better in a specific case, and the accuracy
improvement outweighs the loss of model interpretability. Rather than requiring
explainable AI/ML, regulators should generally permit marketing of the black box,
as long as the device has been proven to be reasonably safe and effective, such as
via a clinical trial. There are drugs available on the U.S. market whose mechanisms
of action are still unknown, such as Acetaminophen.358 Nevertheless, such drugs
are widely used since they have been shown to be reasonably safe and effective.
Consequently, it seems likely that black-box AI/ML models do not affect the trust
of patients and health professionals and thus their use, as long as they function as
promised.359
Autonomous AI-Based Diagnostic System for Detection of Diabetic Retinopathy in Primary Care
Offices, 1 NPJ DIGIT. MED., no. 39 (2018).
354 Derek C. Angus, Randomized Clinical Trials of Artificial Intelligence, 323 JAMA 1043
(2020).
355 James L. Johnston et al., Clinical Evidence Supporting US Food and Drug Administration
Clearance of Novel Therapeutic Devices via the De Novo Pathway Between 2011 and 2019, 180
JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1701 (2020); James L. Johnston et al., Clinical Evidence Supporting FDA
Clearance of First-of-a-Kind Therapeutic Devices via the De Novo Pathway Between 2011 and 2019,
https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.04.23.20077164v2.
356 Haotian Lin et al., Diagnostic Efficacy and Therapeutic Decision-Making Capacity of an
Artificial Intelligence Platform for Childhood Cataracts in Eye Clinics: A Multicentre Randomized
Controlled Trial, 9 ECLINICALMED. 52 (2019); Pu Wang et al., Real-Time Automatic Detection
System Increases Colonoscopic Polyp and Adenoma Detection Rates: A Prospective Randomised
Controlled Study, 68 GUT 1813 (2019). For more information, see Myura Nagendran et al., Artificial
Intelligence Versus Clinicians: Systematic Review of Design, Reporting Standards, and Claims of
Deep Learning Studies, 368 BMJ m689 (2020).
357 Wang et al., supra note 356, at 1813.
358 See, e.g., K. Toussaint et al., What Do We (Not) Know About How Paracetamol
(Acetaminophen) Works?, 35 J. CLINICAL PHARM. & THERAPEUTICS 617 (2010).
359 See Liu et al., supra note 325.
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Clinical trials can support a reasonable assurance that the AI/ML-based
medical device is safe and effective for its intended use. In an ideal world, RCTs
would perhaps be desirable for all AI/ML-based medical devices, especially black
boxes, but are they really feasible? Clinical trials will work for some but not for all
AI/ML models.360 For example, they will work for those algorithms that divide
patients into groups and propose a specific treatment.361 However, some algorithms
are intended to make recommendations that are highly personalized so that clinical
trials would be challenging, perhaps even infeasible, and might overwhelm
standard RCT designs.362 Another problem is adaptive algorithms that can
continuously learn and adapt to new conditions.363 These AI/ML systems are not
static, and thus the benefit of clinical trials will likely not last long since the
algorithms change.364 This is particularly problematic given that clinical trials are
costly and time-consuming. For adaptive algorithms, regulators like the FDA need
to focus their efforts especially on continuous risk monitoring.365
On the flip side, the lack of reliable evidence may jeopardize patient safety
and undermine public trust in the FDA. Some people fear that AI companies live
the motto “fail fast and fix it later.”366 If this is true, the risk concerns for blackbox AI/ML models are significant since the users cannot look inside the boxes and
thus do not know whether their outputs are correct. Nathan Cortez has also
correctly pointed out that “the lack of reliable evidence may depress demand and
thus adoption of digital health products,” including AI.367 On the other hand,
Nicholson Price rightly warns that mandating clinical trials for black-box AI/ML
models could “slow or stifle innovation.”368
This is a dilemma for regulators: An optimal path would be to facilitate
innovation while ensuring that AI/ML models, especially black boxes, are
reasonably safe and effective. It will be a challenge to juggle the different
stakeholder interests. However, for the new regulatory framework for AI-based
medical devices, the FDA should, where feasible and in light of patient safety, at
least require clinical trials for those AI/ML-based medical devices (i.e.,
360 Price, Artificial Intelligence in Health Care, supra note 6, at 11.
361 Id.
362 See Angus, supra note 354, at 1044; Price, Artificial Intelligence in Health Care, supra note
6, at 11.
363 For adaptive algorithms, see supra Part I.
364 W. Nicholson Price II, Black-Box Medicine, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 419, 460 (2015). For
the update problem, see infra Section IV.B.
365 See infra Section IV.B.3.
366 Liz Szabo, A Reality Check On Artificial Intelligence: Are Health Care Claims Overblown?
KHN (Dec. 30, 2019), https://khn.org/news/a-reality-check-on-artificial-intelligence-are-healthcare-claims-overblown.
367 Cortez, supra note 11, at 21.
368 Price, Artificial Intelligence in Health Care, supra note 6, at 11.
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interpretable AI/ML systems and black boxes) that have a higher risk level. The
FDA could leverage the IMDRF framework for risk categorization of SaMD369 to
determine whether a clinical trial is needed. The FDA could, for example, require
clinical evidence for all AI/ML-based medical devices that would be classified as
risk level III or IV devices, and for some black boxes that would be classified as
risk level II devices, such as those that fall into the category “treat or diagnose” or
“drive clinical management.” It is justified to require clinical trials for AI/MLbased medical devices that are black boxes more often than for white boxes, since
black boxes raise additional concerns because of their noninterpretability.
There may be also exceptions where one always wants to know why an
AI/ML-based medical device made a particular recommendation and where the
use of a black box would not be sufficient, even with a successful clinical trial that
provides valid scientific evidence that the device is reasonably safe and effective
for its intended use. For example, imagine a black-box prediction model is used
for triage decisions during a pandemic to decide which patient should be prioritized
for receiving a ventilator based on the patient’s risk of mortality. In such a life-ordeath decision, one would like to know for concerns of justice—understood here
as concerns about how one should fairly allocate scarce resources370—why the
model concluded that patient X has a high or low risk of dying and thus should
(not) be prioritized over patient Y. Consequently, AI-based mortality prediction
models should not only be clearly classified as medical devices under FDCA
section 201(h)(1) and subject to FDA regulation—as I have argued above371—but
the FDA should also require AI makers to use interpretable systems from the outset
in cases where their intended use poses concerns of justice. In general, for reasons
of procedural fairness, if AI/ML-based medical devices are intended to be used to
allocate scarce resources, such as ventilators or organs,372 it would be appropriate
and likely necessary for the FDA to demand the use of interpretable AI/ML
systems even if black boxes performed better.
These are certainly not easy waters to navigate. But once the FDA has figured
out the details of the new regulatory framework for AI-based medical devices, as

369 See supra Figure 2.
370 See Babic et al., supra note 22, at 286.
371 See supra Section II.B.4. In this scenario, the AI-based mortality prediction model would
already not be CDS since the model would “drive clinical management,” which would go beyond
“supporting or providing recommendations. See supra Figure 1 and Figure 2; INT’L MED. DEVICE
REGULS. F., supra note 63, at 11; U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 85, at 14. Moreover, the
model would perhaps already not be considered a medical device under FDCA § 201(h)(1); it is
highly unclear whether it would be “intended for use in the . . . treatment . . . of disease . . . .” FDCA
§ 201(h)(1)(B), 21 U.S.C. § 321(h)(1)(B); see supra Section II.B.3.
372 See Babic et al., supra note 22, at 286; Gali Katznelson & Sara Gerke, The Need for Health
AI Ethics in Medical School Education, 26 ADVANCES HEALTH SCI. EDUC. 1447, 1453 (2021); Boris
Babic et al., Can AI Fairly Decide Who Gets An Organ Transplant?, HARV. BUS. REV. (2020).
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suggested here, Congress should enact legislation to enable the FDA to implement
it.
B. Update Problem
1.

Safety Concerns

AI/ML-based SaMD are distinct from other medical devices insofar as they
can learn from new data and improve their performance. This distinctive feature,
however, poses challenges for regulators like the FDA. At the moment, the FDA
typically only clears or approves AI/ML-based SaMD with “locked” algorithms.373
“Locked” algorithms do not change with use and provide the same outcome each
time the same input data is supplied.374 In cases where an algorithm changes, the
AI/ML-based SaMD will likely need to undergo another premarket review.375
However, the problem is that to fully realize their potential, AI/ML-based SaMD
need to constantly learn and thus require frequent updates, many of which involve
algorithm architecture changes and retraining with new data sets.376 But since these
updates will likely require another round of premarket review, they may not be
carried out. The manufacturer, for example, could be a small start-up that simply
cannot afford the costs of one or multiple new premarket submissions.377 Further,
it may well be that a company refrains from carrying out necessary updates to not
send the wrong message about the AI/ML’s current quality.378 It could also be that
the manufacturer wants to avoid the significant efforts and time involved in
preparing a new submission, and thus decides to perform fewer updates than
needed or, worse, no updates at all.
Consequently, this “update problem” raises new regulatory challenges for the
FDA. An AI/ML-based SaMD that is not frequently updated may pose significant
risks to patients. For example, imagine the FDA permits marketing authorization
of an AI/ML-based SaMD that analyzes photos taken by the physician of a
patient’s skin and assesses the risk for certain types of skin cancer, such as
melanoma. In the U.S., skin cancer is the most common cancer, and early diagnosis

373 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 19, at 3.
374 Id. For locked algorithms, see supra Part I.
375 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 19, at 3, 6. For more information on when to submit
a 510(k) for software changes to existing devices, see U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DECIDING WHEN
TO SUBMIT A 510(K) FOR A SOFTWARE CHANGE TO AN EXISTING DEVICE: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY
AND FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION STAFF 16 (2017), https://www.fda.gov/media/99785
/download.
376 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 19, at 6.
377 Babic et al., supra note 25, at 1202.
378 Id.
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may be essential to avoid death.379 However, suppose this AI/ML-based SaMD
was trained mainly on images of white skin. Thus, this device will likely have high
false-positive and false-negative results when used on patients with darker skin.
For example, inflammation often appears pink or red on white skin, while it is
violaceous or brown on black skin,380 and there are many more differences related
to skin color. In addition, although melanoma, the most serious skin cancer type,
is rare in African American people, it is associated with a worse prognosis than in
Caucasian people.381 Thus, if melanoma goes undetected, for example, it can cost
lives that could have been saved. However, if the illustrative AI/ML-based SaMD
is used more frequently on patients with darker skin and more data are collected,
the device can improve its clinical performance and make a more accurate
diagnosis if updated. Of course, for an AI/ML-based SaMD like the one in this
hypothetical example, the FDA should ensure that it does not receive marketing
authorization in the first place and demand training of the algorithm on diverse
data sets, including African American patients, to mitigate such bias. Regulators
like the FDA could require AI/ML developers to sufficiently diversify training data
in order to mitigate biases and ensure that AI/ML-based medical devices are
reasonably safe and effective across various subpopulations.382 However, even
then, there is always a chance that a relevant subpopulation is unknown at the time
of marketing authorization.383 Thus, AI/ML-based SaMD with adaptive algorithms
that continuously learn and adapt to new conditions could “unlock” the full
potential of health AI and enable precision medicine.384
As a result, it is important that regulators like the FDA develop a regulatory
framework that promotes innovation and updates of AI/ML-based SaMD, while
379 3Derm Systems, Inc., 3Derm Announces Two FDA Breakthrough Device Designations for
Autonomous Skin Cancer AI, PR NEWSWIRE (Jan. 7, 2020), https://www.prnewswire.com/newsreleases/3derm-announces-two-fda-breakthrough-device-designations-for-autonomous-skin-cancerai-300982072.html.
380 Art Papier, To Begin Addressing Racial Bias in Medicine, Start With the Skin, STAT (July
20, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/2020/07/20/to-begin-addressing-racial-bias-in-medicine-startwith-the-skin.
381 Krishnaraj Mahendraraj et al., Malignant Melanoma in African–Americans, 96 MED. 1
(2019). For more information about melanoma, see Melanoma, MAYO CLINIC (Jan. 20, 2022),
https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/melanoma/symptoms-causes/syc-20374884.
382 See, e.g., Ross, supra note 1 (criticizing a lack of transparency in the current FDA approach
that also seems to be inconsistent); Casey Ross, Could AI Tools for Breast Cancer Worsen
Disparities? Patchy Public Data in FDA Filings Fuel Concern, STAT (Feb. 11, 2021), https://www
.statnews.com/2021/02/11/breast-cancer-disparities-artificial-intelligence-fda.
383 Babic et al., supra note 25, at 1202 (providing an example on HIV vaccine studies, where
a relevant subpopulation—uncircumcised men who had high titers of preexisting antibodies against
Ad5 and who both had sex with men—were unknown ex ante). For more information on immune
activation with HIV vaccines, see Anthony S. Fauci et al., Immune Activation with HIV Vaccines,
344 SCI. 49 (2014).
384 See supra Part I for adaptive algorithms.
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ensuring that the devices remain safe and effective throughout their life cycle.
2.

The FDA’s TPLC Approach and Action Plan

To its credit, the FDA has already spent a considerable amount of time
thinking about how to address the update problem. In April 2019, the FDA released
a discussion paper in which the agency proposed a regulatory framework for
modifications to AI/ML-based SaMD (“discussion paper”).385 As envisioned in its
Software Pre-Cert Program, the FDA intends to apply a Total Product Lifecycle
(TPLC) approach for AI/ML-based SaMD that would enable such devices to
continuously learn and improve while providing adequate safeguards.386 As
discussed above, to fully implement the Pre-Cert TPLC approach, where particular
companies would be “precertified,” the FDA would need to ask Congress for
additional statutory authority.387
The TPLC approach for AI/ML-based SaMD suggested in the FDA’s
discussion paper would apply exclusively to those AI/ML-based SaMD that are
subject to premarket submission.388 AI/ML-based SaMD that are Class I or Class II
exempt are not within the scope of this suggested approach.389 In particular, the
TPLC approach would rely on a predetermined change control plan that
manufacturers could optionally submit during the initial premarket review of their
AI/ML-based SaMD.390 This plan would include SaMD Pre-Specifications and an
Algorithm Change Protocol.391 SaMD Pre-Specifications delineate the types of
anticipated modifications.392 The Algorithm Change Protocol is the associated
methodology that the manufacturer has in place to implement those modifications
and to control their risks to patients.393
The FDA divides the types of anticipated modifications into three broad
categories:
(1) performance,
(2) inputs, and

385 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 19.
386 Id. at 3, 4; for the Pre-Cert Program, see supra Section III.C.
387 See supra Section III.C.
388 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 19, at 8.
389 Id.
390 Id. at 10.
391 Id.
392 Id.
393 Id.
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(3) intended use.394
The first category includes modifications that improve clinical and analytical
performance, such as an increased sensitivity of the AI/ML-based SaMD at
detecting breast cancer.395 The second category is modifications that change the
inputs used by the algorithm, such as adding different input data types.396 For the
third category, the FDA leverages the IMDRF framework for risk categorization
of SaMD.397 It includes those types of modifications that result in a change in the:
•

state of the health care situation or condition (e.g.,
expanding the intended patient population to include
children), and such modifications are explicitly claimed
by the manufacturer; or

•

intended condition or disease (e.g., expanding the use of
an AI/ML-based SaMD to detect a second type of cancer);
or

•

significance of the information provided by the SaMD
(e.g., a change from “drive clinical management” to “treat
or diagnose”).398

According to the FDA’s proposal in its discussion paper, a manufacturer of an
AI/ML-based SaMD could submit a predetermined change control plan for many
scenarios.399 However, the FDA considers SaMD Pre-Specifications and
Algorithm Change Protocols inappropriate in cases where the AI/ML-based
SaMD’s intended use or risk may significantly change.400 An example would be a
change from a “non-serious” to a “critical” health care situation or condition, such
as an AI/ML-based SaMD that initially uses skin images to manage scar healing
and is updated to diagnose melanoma.401
In its discussion paper, the FDA also highlights that the TPLC approach can
only fully be adopted by enabling real-world performance monitoring of AI/ML-

394 Id. at 6.
395 Id.
396 Id. at 7.
397 For more information on the IMDRF framework for risk categorization of SaMD, see supra
Section II.B.3.
398 See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 19, at 7. For SaMD risk categories developed
by the IMDRF, see supra Figure 2.
399 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 19, at 7.
400 Id.
401 Id. For SaMD risk categories developed by the IMDRF, see supra Figure 2.
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based SaMD and increased user transparency.402 Manufacturers would be expected
to commit to both of these principles.403 For example, they would need to provide
periodic reporting to the FDA on updates that were carried out based on the
predetermined change control plan.404 However, there are still numerous questions
unanswered, such as: How much data would have to be provided? How can
manufacturers demonstrate transparency about performance improvement,
labeling changes, or algorithm updates of AI/ML-based SaMD?405
Many details of the FDA’s proposed regulatory framework in its discussion
paper still need to be figured out.406 In January 2021, the newly launched FDA’s
Digital Health Center of Excellence issued an Action Plan for AI/ML-Based
SaMD.407 This Action Plan is a response to stakeholder feedback to the discussion
paper and outlines five actions the FDA aims to take:
(1) Updating the FDA’s proposed regulatory framework laid
out in its discussion paper, including publishing draft
guidance on the predetermined change control plan.
(2) Encouraging the development of Good Machine Learning
Practice.
(3) Supporting a patient-centered approach by holding, for
example, a public workshop on AI/ML-based medical
device labeling to promote transparency to users.
(4) Fostering efforts on the development of methods to assess
and improve machine learning algorithms, including to
identify and eliminate bias.
(5) Advancing real-world performance pilots together with
stakeholders.408
3.

The Need for Continuous Risk Monitoring

The FDA’s vision of relying on SaMD Pre-Specifications and Algorithm
Change Protocols in many scenarios is flawed because manufacturers often do not
402 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 19, at 14.
403 Id.
404 Id.
405 Id.at 15.
406 Id. at 4.
407 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 264.
408 See id. at 7.
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know at the time of the initial premarket review what updates will be required in
the future.409 Only after the marketing authorization and use of the AI/ML-based
SaMD in clinical practice do many necessary updates become apparent. Thus, it is
especially important for the FDA to focus on continuous risk monitoring once the
AI/ML-based SaMD is legally launched on the U.S. market.410 The agency needs
to look out for new risks due to AI/ML features, such as covariate shift, concept
drift, and instability.411
Covariate shift occurs when the data the algorithm was trained on before
marketing authorization is different from the input distribution of new data.412 For
example, an AI/ML-based SaMD may be trained on data from a nursing home with
only patients over sixty-five but shall now be deployed in a large municipal
hospital with a diverse patient population.
Concept drift exists in cases where there is a change of the true relation
between inputs and outputs.413 Take an AI/ML-based SaMD, for example, that
makes recommendations on breast cancer risk by analyzing the results of
mammograms. Suppose the device does not track the patient’s race. However, the
breast density varies between Caucasian women and African American women,
and African American women are also more likely to die from malignant tumors
than are Caucasian women.414 Thus, depending on the patient’s race, the same
image may result in two different probabilistic diagnoses.415
Instability describes a situation where an AI/ML-based SaMD does not treat
similar patients similarly.416 For example, an AI/ML-based SaMD that detects lung
cancer and classifies medically similar lung lesions entirely differently is unstable.
For continuous monitoring of AI/ML-based SaMD, the FDA could, for
example, leverage its national monitoring system Sentinel.417 The FDA launched
409 Babic et al., supra note 25, at 1203-04.
410 See id. at 1204.
411 Id. at 1203-04.
412 Id. at 1203. For more information on covariate shift, see, for example, Steffen Bickel et al.,
Discriminative Learning for Differing Training and Test Distributions (2007) (unpublished
manuscript), https://icml.cc/imls/conferences/2007/proceedings/papers/303.pdf.
413 Babic et al., supra note 25, at 1203.
414 Id. at 1202; Amrita Khalid, Google’s AI for Mammograms Doesn’t Account for Racial
Differences, QUARTZ (Jan. 9, 2020), https://qz.com/1781123/googles-ai-for-mammograms-doesntaccount-for-race. For statistics on breast cancer, see KAISER FAM. FOUND., COVERAGE OF BREAST
CANCER SCREENING AND PREVENTION SERVICES (Sept. 26, 2019), https://www.kff.org/womenshealth-policy/fact-sheet/coverage-of-breast-cancer-screening-and-prevention-services.
415 See Babic et al., supra note 25, at 1202-03. For more examples, see Boris Babic et al., When
Machine Learning Goes Off the Rails, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan.-Feb. 2021), https://hbr.org/2021
/01/when-machine-learning-goes-off-the-rails.
416 Babic et al., supra note 22, at 1203-04.
417 See Babic et al., supra note 25, at 1204; I. Glenn Cohen et al., The European Artificial
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the Sentinel Initiative in response to Congress’ mandate in the FDA Amendments
Act of 2007418 to develop novel ways to evaluate the safety of marketed medical
products.419 The FDA also announced in September 2019 that Sentinel will expand
to three coordinating centers, one of which, the Sentinel Operations Center, is
focusing, among other topics, on AI.420
In addition to using a national monitoring system and having an appropriate
division of labor,421 a continuous risk monitoring approach for AI/ML-based
SaMD should consist of at least three other elements:
(1) retesting,
(2) simulated checks, and
(3) adversarial stress tests.422
First, AI/ML-based SaMD should be continuously retested on all previous
cases.423 Second, AI/ML-based SaMD should be constantly used on “simulated
patients” to assess whether their behavior is reliable with regard to an adequate
diversity of patient types.424 For example, previous patient data could be used to
create “simulated patients.”425 Third, one could perform algorithmic stress tests
throughout the AI/ML-based SaMD’s life cycle, borrowing from cybersecurity
practices.426 In particular, AI/ML is vulnerable to adversarial attacks, where a
slight change—(almost) undetectable to the human eye—in how inputs are
presented to the system alters its output, leading to an incorrect conclusion.427 This
is especially worrisome in cases where the AI/ML-based SaMD is intended to
detect, for example, a type of cancer, such as skin cancer, and incorrectly classifies

Intelligence Strategy: Implications and Challenges for Digital Health, 2 LANCET DIGIT. HEALTH
e376, e377 (2020); FDA’s Sentinel Initiative, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Oct. 18, 2019),
https://www.fda.gov/safety/fdas-sentinel-initiative.
418 Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat.
823.
419 FDA’s Sentinel Initiative, supra note 417; see also SENTINEL, https://www.sentinelinitiative
.org (last visited Mar. 19, 2022) (providing an overview of Sentinel).
420 FDA’s Sentinel Initiative, supra note 417.
421 Monitoring of AI/ML-based SaMD should be carried out by different actors than those
developing such devices. See Babic et al., supra note 25, at 1204.
422 See id.
423 Id.
424 Id.
425 Id.
426 Id.
427 Samuel G. Finlayson, Adversarial Attacks on Medical Machine Learning, 363 SCI. 1287
(2019).
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the mole with 100% confidence as malignant instead of benign.428 Thus, it is
essential that AI/ML-based SaMD rigorously undergo algorithmic stress tests
throughout their entire life cycle.
As a result, a robust continuous risk monitoring approach, like the one
suggested above, can help to ensure that AI/ML-based SaMD remain safe and
effective throughout their life cycle. This approach also allows the FDA to quickly
recall an AI/ML-based SaMD from the market if necessary.
V. SYSTEM VIEW
It is essential that the FDA broadens its view and considers AI-based medical
devices as systems, not just devices.429 The agency should focus more on the
environment in which AI-based medical devices are deployed. This system view
is crucial to ensure that AI-based medical devices are reasonably safe and effective
as well as benefit patients. In this Part, I carve out two components of the system
view: (1) considering human-AI interaction and (2) improving patient outcomes.
A. Considering Human-AI Interaction
Generally, when AI-based medical devices enter medical practice, they will
interact with humans to varying degrees (from little to collaboratively). Thus, it is
essential that regulators like the FDA broaden their view and systematically
consider the interaction between the human and the AI. The system view is
especially relevant for AI-based medical devices because their performance in the
actual practice setting is less predictable than that of traditional medical devices,
such as crutches or contact lenses.430 AI-based medical devices can be biased,
opaque, and/or adaptive. Human factors and the interaction of these complex
systems with the environment will likely increase variance between such medical
devices’ performance in simulated testing settings and real life.431
For example, imagine an AI-based medical device that is developed and used
in a highly specialized clinic and makes sophisticated recommendations to
specialist personnel in that clinic. The device shall now be deployed in another
hospital in a rural area that is not as specialized as the clinic who developed it and
has far fewer medical specialists. It may well be that the recommendations the AI
makes are not feasible, useful, safe, and/or cost-effective for less specialized

428 Id. at 1287-88.
429 Sara Gerke et al., The Need for a System View to Regulate Artificial Intelligence/Machine
Learning-Based Software as Medical Device, 3 NPJ DIGIT. MED., no. 53 (2020).
430 Id. at 2.
431 Id.
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personnel in a rural hospital.432 In other words, as Mildred Cho puts it: “Systems
developed in one hospital often flop when deployed in a different facility.”433 Thus,
AI bears the risk of “contextual” bias.434
Although perhaps desirable, it will likely not be feasible to require licenses at
the level of an individual clinic.435 However, the FDA could at least require
rigorous human factors testing for all AI-based medical devices that require
premarket submission. This would include, for example, a demonstration that users
can use the AI-based medical device correctly based merely on reading the labeling
and that they can correctly interpret its output and understand that such devices
bear the risks of false-positive and false-negative readings. If it is an AI-based
home monitoring technology, which is used without (direct) supervision by a
health care professional, human factors testing should also include that users do
not over-rely on its output and comprehend when to seek medical care.436 To its
credit, the FDA required human factors testing for a few AI-based medical devices
that received marketing authorization via the De Novo pathway, such as for IDxDR and Apple’s irregular rhythm notification feature.437 However, such testing
should be standardized and required for all AI-based medical devices that are
subject to premarket submission. It is also important that the testing be carried out
in actual practice settings since the results will likely vary with the human
involvement in decision-making.438
Another issue in the human-AI interaction is training and education. A good,
although non-AI, example is the da Vinci surgical system. Da Vinci is a robot that
helps surgeons to perform minimally invasive surgery. The surgeon uses a console,
and the da Vinci system translates the surgeon’s hand movements.439 The FDA
first cleared the system in 2000, but since then, unfortunately, many patients have
suffered severe complications, some of which even resulted in death.440 One of the
reasons for such complications was a lack of training of the surgeons with the
432 Timo Minssen, Sara Gerke, Mateo Aboy, Nicholson Price & Glenn Cohen, Regulatory
Responses to Medical Machine Learning, 7 J. L. & BIOSCI. l, 17 (2020).
433 Szabo, supra note 366.
434 Nicholson Price, Medical AI and Contextual Bias, 33 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 66 (2019).
435 Gerke et al., supra note 429, at 3.
436 Gerke et al., supra note 3, at 1178.
437 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 32; Letter from Angela C. Krueger to Donna-Bea
Tillman, supra note 50.
438 Gerke et al., supra note 429, at 4.
439 About Da Vinci Systems, INTUITIVE (2022), https://www.davincisurgery.com/da-vincisystems/about-da-vinci-systems.
440 Kristin Compton, Da Vinci Surgical System, DRUGWATCH
(2021),
https://www.drugwatch.com/davinci-surgery; see also Emily R. Siegel et al., The Da Vinci Surgical
Robot: A Medical Breakthrough With Risks for Patients, NBC NEWS (Dec. 19, 2018), https://www
.nbcnews.com/health/health-news/da-vinci-surgical-robot-medical-breakthrough-risks-patientsn949341 (telling the story of Laurie Featherstone, an injured patient).
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device.441
Training and education, in particular, are crucial for all users of AI-based
medical devices since their outcomes can vary considerably the more human
involvement there is.442 For example, in February 2020, the FDA permitted
marketing of the first cardiac ultrasound (echocardiography) software, called
Caption Guidance, via the De Novo pathway.443 The software uses AI to help the
user capture images of patients’ hearts.444 The peculiarity of the software is that it
can be used by non-experts, such as nurses with only a few days of training.445
Thus, since more AI-based medical devices, similar to IDx-DR and Caption
Guidance, that can be used by non-experts are likely to enter the U.S. market in
the near future, training and education of the users of such devices at regular
intervals will be even more important. Hence, even if the FDA does not regulate
the practice of medicine, the agency could more often demand that AI makers set
up a training program with instructions on how to use the AI-based medical device,
such as the agency did in the case of IDx-DR.446 Alternatively or additionally, the
FDA could more frequently require AI-makers to include a detailed description of
the recommended user training in the labeling of the AI/ML-based medical device,
as was the case, for example, for Caption Guidance.447
A research team at Duke University is also thinking about new ways of
labeling health AIs, similar to “nutrition labels” that contain facts on the intended
use of the system and how it should be used.448 More initiatives such as the one at
Duke are needed to better understand what content such labeling should include to
promote user transparency and comprehension of the benefits, shortcomings, and
risks of AI-based medical devices and to mitigate user errors. It is thus to be
welcomed that the FDA has recently organized a public workshop on transparency
441 Siegel et al., supra note 440.
442 Gerke et al., supra note 429, at 2.
443 Letter from Robert Ochs, Deputy Dir. Radiological Health, U.S. Food & Drug Admin. to
Sam Surette, RA/QA Manager, Caption Health, Inc. (Feb. 7, 2020), https://www.accessdata.fda.gov
/cdrh_docs/pdf19/DEN190040.pdf; FDA News Release: FDA Authorizes Marketing of First Cardiac
Ultrasound Software That Uses Artificial Intelligence to Guide User, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.
(Feb. 7, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-authorizes-marketingfirst-cardiac-ultrasound-software-uses-artificial-intelligence-guide-user.
444 Id.
445 Id.; Casey Ross, AI Has Arrived in Medical Imaging. Now the FDA Needs to Monitor Its
Impact on Patients, STAT (Febr. 28, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/2020/02/28/ai-medicalimaging-fda-monitor-impact-patients.
446 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 32, at 11; Gerke et al., supra note 429.
447 Letter from Robert Ochs to Sam Surette., supra note 443, at 3.
448 See Mark P. Sendak et al., Presenting Machine Learning Model Information to Clinical
End Users With Model Facts Labels, 3 NPJ DIGIT. MED., no. 41 (2020); Erin Brodwin, With ‘Nutrition
Labels’ and an Anthropologist’s Eye, Duke Pioneers a New Approach to AI in Medicine, STAT
(Oct. 5, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/2020/10/05/duke-artificial-intelligence-hospitalmedicine.
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of AI/ML-based medical devices, in which the topic of labeling was also discussed,
to gather input from stakeholders.449
Another example to see the challenges of the interaction between the human
and the AI is mortality prediction models. As I have established and argued
above,450 it is highly unclear whether AI-based mortality prediction models are
medical devices under current law, but they should be. Imagine that the model
predicts the patient will die in the next 12 months. However, the patient’s physician
did not foresee this. What should the physician do? Should the physician rely on
the AI or ignore its prediction? Should the physician start an end-of-life discussion
with the patient? Should the physician tell the patient about the AI? Imagine that
the physician decides to talk to the patient about the possibility of death in the next
12 months but does not mention the AI. Is this the right choice? What happens if
the AI turns out to be wrong and the physician stops (instead of continues) the
patient’s treatment?
These are tricky questions that have not received enough attention, even
though many hospitals are already using these systems on real patients.451 Suppose
a health AI-based product is intended to be used in critical, sensitive situations,
such as predicting a patient’s death. In that case, it is essential that society starts a
discussion about transparency and whether the patient has a right to know that an
AI was involved and may have influenced the physician’s decision to stop or
continue treatment. The interaction between the human and the AI is crucial for a
successful outcome. The hospitals that deploy such AIs should develop best
practice guidance on how to use these tools. Even if the FDA does not regulate the
practice of medicine, there is still something the agency can do. First, as argued
above,452 the FDA could ask Congress to amend the FDCA and clearly classify AIbased mortality prediction models as medical devices and ensure that they are
reasonably safe and effective when launched on the U.S. market and used to make
such sensitive predictions. Second, once AI-based mortality prediction models are
clearly classified as medical devices, the FDA could then demand that AI makers
set up a training program with instructions on how to use the device and/or require
them to include a detailed description of the recommended user training in the
labeling of the device. Third, the FDA may also consider requiring—similar to the
449 Virtual Public Workshop - Transparency of Artificial Intelligence/Machine LearningEnabled Medical Devices, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Oct. 14, 2021),
https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/workshops-conferences-medical-devices/virtual-publicworkshop-transparency-artificial-intelligencemachine-learning-enabled-medical-devices.
450 See supra Section II.B.3 and Section II.B.4.
451 See, e.g., Robbins, supra note 145; Rebecca Robbins & Erin Brodwin, An Invisible Hand:
Patients Aren’t Being Told About the AI Systems Advising Their Care, STAT (July 15, 2020),
https://www.statnews.com/2020/07/15/artificial-intelligence-patient-consent-hospitals.
452 See supra Section II.B.4.
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case of emergency use authorizations for medical devices453—AI makers to
develop fact sheets for health professionals and patients (the latter written in plain
language) that help them to better understand the device, such as its intended use,
its benefits, and its risks. In the fact sheet for health professionals, the manufacturer
could also include practical information on how best to handle the situation and
predictions by the AI.
In general, a discussion with all stakeholders in the field should begin with the
question of whether patients (should) have a right to know about the involvement
of an AI-based prediction model. Some hospitals are currently using those systems
without telling their patients.454 Is that morally justifiable? Instead of hiding new
AI-based products behind the scenes, is it not better to be frank upfront and
promote trust in the doctor-patient relationship? I. Glenn Cohen has recently
written about informed consent and medical AI, arguing that “the existing legal
doctrine of informed consent does not robustly support an obligation to disclose
the use of medical AI/ML,” with some exceptions, such as when the patient
explicitly asked for the basis of the decision making and is misinformed by the
physician.455 Cohen mentioned in an interview that trust in the health care system
and AI could be undercut if patients “were to find out, after the fact, that there’s a
rash of this being used without anyone ever telling them.”456 Thus, this discussion
about the human-AI interaction is crucial and needs to happen now among
stakeholders, including patients. As can be seen, many open questions have yet to
be answered regarding the human-AI interaction, but the system view can help
regulators like the FDA and stakeholders see these issues and address them.
B. Improving Patient Outcomes
The second lesson the system view gives us is that AI-based medical devices
do not only need to be safe but should also improve patient outcomes. This is a
crucial point, but it has, unfortunately, been neglected so far. As the chess player,
Garry Kasparov, correctly pointed out: “Weak human + machine + better process
was superior to a strong computer alone and, more remarkably, superior to a strong
human + machine + inferior process.”457 Thus, the decisive point is the “process,”
and if one does not know more about the process of the AI-based medical device,

453 Gerke et al., supra note 3, at 1179.
454 Robbins, supra note 145. Empathy may also play an important role here. See Nicolas Terry,
Appification, AI, and Healthcare’s New Iron Triangle, 20 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 117, 159–67
(2018).
455 Cohen, supra note 7, at 1467 (2020).
456 Robbins & Brodwin, supra note 451.
457 GARRY KASPAROV, DEEP THINKING: WHERE MACHINE INTELLIGENCE ENDS AND HUMAN
CREATIVITY BEGINS 214 (2017).
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one does not know whether it will improve outcomes.458 Kasparov teaches us that
even if one has an accurate health AI—which is itself challenging to achieve—
human factors and the environment in which the product will be deployed need to
be considered to ensure that the health AI actually benefits patients.
It seems that so far, however, most AI-based medical devices have not been
shown to improve patient outcomes. For example, it is unclear whether IDx-DR,
which has already been used in clinical care at over twenty sites across the U.S.,
improves patient outcomes.459 To its credit, the company is currently carrying out
several studies to examine whether diabetic patients who receive a positive result
of more than a mild level of diabetic retinopathy are going to the ophthalmologist
and receiving care.460 The company has also recently launched a care coordination
model that will ensure that patients with a positive result receive follow-up care.461
These are laudable actions, but a rare exception in the field. Thus, the FDA could
step in and require, for example, comparative studies for AI-based medical devices
where appropriate that demonstrate better outcomes with versus without the
device. The FDA could either demand them as a premarket or postmarket
requirement, depending on whether the AI-based medical device is urgently
needed on the market. Again, the challenge faced by regulators will be to properly
balance the different stakeholder interests. The optimal way would be facilitating
innovation while simultaneously ensuring that the U.S. market will not be flooded
with useless products that do not improve patient outcomes and are also not
otherwise valuable, such as products that do not even reduce the labor burden on
physicians.
Another example is mobile health apps. There are over 400,000 mobile health
apps on the market, but little data on whether or not they actually benefit
patients.462 Most of them, as discussed earlier,463 are not classified as medical
devices and are not FDA reviewed. However, even the ones that are considered to
be medical devices have not necessarily been shown to do more good than harm.
Take, for example, Apple’s irregular rhythm notification feature that is intended to
notify the user of possible AFib.464 Most users of the Apple Watch are young and

458 Gerke et al., supra note 429, at 2.
459 Carfagno, supra note 35.
460 Id.
461 Id.
462 See Stephan Fihn et al., Deploying AI in Clinical Settings, in ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN
HEALTH CARE: THE HOPE, THE HYPE, THE PROMISE, THE PERIL 151, 152 (Michael Matheny et al. eds.,
1st ed. 2019); Michael Georgiou, Developing a Healthcare App in 2022: What do Patients Really
Want?, IMAGINOVATION (Dec. 15, 2021), https://www.imaginovation.net/blog/developing-a-mobilehealth-app-what-patients-really-want.
463 See supra Section II.B.1.
464 For more information on the app, see supra Section I.B.
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healthy people who usually are not considered at risk for suffering Afib.465 Around
70% of individuals with Afib are between 65 and 85 years old.466 In addition,
diagnostic tools can always have false-positive and false-negative results. This
may perhaps also be the reason why Apple narrowed the app’s indications for use:
the app is explicitly “not intended to provide a notification on every episode of
irregular rhythm suggestive of Afib” and “is not intended to replace traditional
methods of diagnosis or treatment.”467 Still, it is likely that many users do not know
that Apple’s app is not for diagnosis and therefore the irregular rhythm notification
feature gives them a false sense of security. For example, they may think that they
are healthy and skip a necessary doctor’s appointment because they do not receive
alarming notifications from the app. Thus, more user transparency of the
indications of use for health apps is needed. Moreover, younger people may also
be confronted with a false notification suggestive of Afib and may suffer a shock
that can develop further into real psychological or physical harm. In addition,
individuals with false notifications may likely sit in the waiting rooms of
cardiologists and use unnecessary resources of an already overburdened health
care system.468 In contrast, the ones who would likely benefit most from Apple’s
app, namely the elderly, are less likely to use the Apple Watch.469 Thus, it is also
essential to make sure that all population groups, particularly the vulnerable ones
such as the elderly, benefit from health AI-based products.470 Furthermore, users
who received a notification by using Apple’s app and are diagnosed with brief Afib
by their cardiologist will likely receive blood-thinning medications as a result.
However, one does not know yet whether patients will actually benefit from such
medications—or suffer from bleeding risk—and thus whether they would have
been better off not to have been diagnosed with brief Afib in the first place.471
Some people may certainly benefit from Apple’s app who would have otherwise

465 Casey Ross, COVID-19 Apps and Wearables Are Everywhere. Can They Actually Benefit
Patients?, STAT (Aug. 4, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/2020/08/04/covid19-wearables-appspatient-care.
466 Peter M. Kistler et al., Electrophysiologic and Electroanatomic Changes in the Human
Atrium Associated With Age, 44 J. AM. COLL. CARDIOLOGY 109, 109 (2004).
467 See Letter from Angela C. Krueger to Donna-Bea Tillman, supra note 50.
468 Heather Landi, With Apple’s Launch of an ECG Device, Digital Health Leaders,
Cardiologists See Possibilities, and Limitations, HEALTHCARE INNOVATION (Sept. 18, 2018),
https://www.hcinnovationgroup.com/interoperability-hie/article/13030721/with-apples-launch-ofan-ecg-device-digital-health-leaders-cardiologists-see-possibilities-and-limitations.
469 See, e.g., Mikey Campbell, Apple Watch, Other Wearables Increasingly Used to Manage
Chronic Health Conditions, Study Says, APPLEINSIDER (Aug. 30, 2018), https://appleinsider.com
/articles/18/08/30/apple-watch-other-wearables-increasingly-used-to-manage-chronic-healthconditions-study-says.
470 For more information on promoting health equity and AI, see Nicolas Terry, Of Regulating
Healthcare AI and Robots, 21 YALE J.L. & TECH. 133, 186–89 (2019).
471 Landi, supra note 468.
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perhaps suffered a stroke, but some may not.472 Thus, regulators like the FDA
should apply the system view to not only promote user transparency but also
require comparative studies for AI-based medical devices where appropriate to
ensure that patients actually benefit from these devices.
CONCLUSION
AI, especially its subset ML, has tremendous potential to improve health care.
However, health AI also raises new regulatory challenges. In particular, a new
regulatory framework for AI-based medical devices is needed to ensure that such
devices are reasonably safe and effective when placed on the market and will
remain so throughout their life cycle. Suppose the FDA does not “tame the
demon,” as Elon Musk would say. In that case, the agency would not have realized
the great potential of health AI and patient safety would be jeopardized. Moreover,
disparities in health care would likely be exacerbated instead of reduced,
presumably to the detriment of vulnerable populations such as racial and ethnic
minorities, the economically disadvantaged, the elderly, or people with disabilities.
In this Article, I have especially tried to unpack the complex network of
relevant provisions in the FDCA and (draft) guidance documents related to AIbased medical devices. I have shown that the FDA is not yet ready for health AI
and that there are significant safety and effectiveness concerns associated with the
current regulatory framework. I have advocated for FDA and congressional
actions, and I have focused on how the FDA could, with additional statutory
authority, regulate AI-based medical devices. What follows are my central claims.
First, the current medical device definition, FDCA section 201(h)(1),473 is too
narrow for health AI. Congress should consider amending the definition to include
all CDS, AI-based mortality prediction models, and other models that are intended
for use in the prediction or prognosis of disease or other conditions. This
suggestion also requires that FDCA section 520(o)(1)(E)474 is deleted and that
FDCA section 520(o)(1)(B)475 is amended accordingly to reflect the new medical
device definition. The FDA should also remain free to exercise its enforcement
discretion over lower risk device software functions or lower risk software
functions that may meet the medical device definition.
Second, the 510(k) pathway may not be sufficient to identify safety and
effectiveness concerns of medical devices. The FDA’s reforms to address these
issues are welcome. However, the new Safety and Performance Based Pathway
472 Id.
473 FDCA § 201(h)(1), 21 U.S.C. § 321(h)(1).
474 FDCA § 520(o)(1)(E), 21 U.S.C. § 360j(o)(1)(E).
475 FDCA § 520(o)(1)(B), 21 U.S.C. § 360j(o)(1)(B).
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will likely not be applicable to AI-based medical devices in the near future and is
only intended as a voluntary pathway. The Traditional, Special, or Abbreviated
510(k) pathways thus continue to be available to manufacturers. Consequently, I
propose a new regulatory framework for premarket review of medical devices,
including AI-based medical devices, that would better ensure that medical devices
are reasonably safe and effective when placed on the U.S. market. In particular, I
argue that the new Safety and Performance Based Pathway—if found to be
effective—should replace the Traditional, Special, and Abbreviated 510(k)
pathways and become the only available 510(k) pathway. In addition, the De Novo
Pathway should be modified to also cover those low to moderate risk medical
devices that have a predicate but would not be applicable for the new Safety and
Performance Based Pathway. Further, the FDA’s envisioned Software Pre-Cert
Program raises its own regulatory challenges. If the FDA establishes the Software
Pre-Cert Program’s specific details, the Pilot proves to be effective, and the agency
has statutory authority, the FDA could either implement the Software Pre-Cert
Program similarly to the Pre-Cert Pilot Program or entirely separate from the
traditional premarket pathways with its own conditions.
Third, the FDA should demand that AI/ML makers use an interpretable
AI/ML model if such a model performs better than or as well as the black-box
model for its intended use. If the black-box model performs better, the FDA should
generally permit its marketing to facilitate innovation, as long as there is sufficient
proof that it is safe and effective. A focus on explainable AI/ML is deceptive
because the explanations provided are only ex post approximations of the blackbox algorithms’ decisions instead of the actual reasons for them. The FDA should,
where feasible, require clinical trials at least for those AI/ML-based medical
devices that have a higher risk level. The FDA could leverage the IMDRF
framework for risk categorization of SaMD to determine cases where clinical trials
are needed. However, in cases where AI/ML-based medical devices are intended
to be used to allocate scarce resources, such as ventilators or organs, the FDA
should insist on the use of interpretable AI/ML systems.
Fourth, AI/ML-based medical devices can only fully realize their potential if
they continuously learn and adapt to novel situations. To address the update
problem, the FDA needs to focus on continuous risk monitoring and implement a
monitoring system, such as Sentinel, to continuously monitor AI/ML-based
SaMD.
Fifth, the FDA should broaden its view and consider AI-based medical
devices not just as devices but as systems. In particular, the FDA could require
rigorous human factors testing for all AI-based medical devices that require
premarket submission to demonstrate that users can read the labeling and use them
correctly. The agency could also more often require the AI maker to set up a
training program with instructions on how to use the AI-based medical device
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and/or to include a detailed description of the recommended user training in the
device labeling. In addition, more emphasis should be placed on the AI-based
medical devices’ ability to improve patient outcomes, not only be safe. This could
be demonstrated by comparative studies that the agency could demand, where
appropriate, either as a premarket or postmarket requirement, depending on
whether the AI-based medical device in question is urgently needed on the U.S.
market.

Figure 6: Overview of the Central Claims
Points 1-5 show the central claims. They are arranged in the life cycle of AIbased medical devices — i.e., from premarket to postmarket.
Finally, I conclude that much more work and thinking is required to deliver
the full potential of health AI and ensure that such products are reasonably safe
and effective. Since the law often lags behind technological advances, it is likewise
important that manufacturers design their health AI-based products ethically—
irrespective of whether they are classified as medical devices and are subject to
FDA regulation. This would, among other things, require AI companies to
diversify training data to mitigate biases and ensure that AI-based products are
reasonably safe and effective across various subpopulations and remain so
throughout their life cycle. Lastly, national, and even international, ethical
guidelines for health AI-based products should be developed to establish minimum
ethical standards for the design process of such products.
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